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For decades, works in psychology of thinking and decision making have been reporting 
suboptimal performance and systematic departures from the axioms of probability theory 
in people’s probability judgments. In these first works, poor performance was often 
attributed to people making normatively wrong intuitions because of their limited cognitive 
resources and lack of statistical skills. Over the last years, studies that considered various 
Bayesian models of inductive reasoning but also other high and lower-level cognitive 
processes provided a more optimistic picture by showing that, despite departing from the 
normative benchmark, people’s reasoning skills lead to adaptive and sound performance in 
everyday life. Different explanatory accounts for this suboptimal but sound reasoning have 
been proposed, some being more compelling than others. The present thesis is aimed at 
exploring one of these accounts that is based on confirmation relations and suggests that 
human inductive ability might rely more on estimating evidential impact than posterior 
probability. So far, this account has been applied to classical probabilistic reasoning errors, 
linguistic and psycholinguistic phenomena and probabilistic inferences with verbal stimuli. 
In this study, we tried to see whether the implicit estimation of confirmation relations can 
affect probability judgments also when the link between evidence and hypotheses is 
operationalized as the arbitrary association between visual features in briefly presented 
figures. First, we expected participants to consider confirmed hypotheses more probable 
than corresponding (in terms of posterior probability) disconfirmed ones; second, we 
expected them to choose the more likely option (i.e. the normatively correct one) more often 
when it was confirmed by the evidence provided than when it was disconfirmed. Four 
computer-based experiments were conducted using the same methodology. Experimental 
stimuli consisted of inductive arguments concerning 40 sets of figures composed of two 
features with two possible values each. By varying the probabilistic association between the 
two values of the features, sets were generated to have, for each possible combination of the 
two features, two arguments with the same posteriors and opposite impacts. In each trial, 
participants first looked at a set of figures. One of these figures was then randomly drawn. 
Participants were informed about the value of one feature of the drawn figure (e.g., that it 
was a “circle”) and had to guess the value of the other feature (“white” vs. “black”). 
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Throughout the four experiments, we used three different combinations of features: color 
and shape (exp.1: black/white; exp 2: light/dark grey), pattern and shape (exp 3) and type 
and orientation of line (exp 4). 
In all four experiments, participants systematically chose the confirmed alternative over the 
equally probable, but disconfirmed one, and chose the normatively incorrect (i.e. less likely) 
alternative more often when it was confirmed (vs. disconfirmed) by the evidence provided. 
These results provided a first empirical evidence of the effect of confirmation relations on 
probability judgment with perceptual stimuli, but also highlighted a significant influence of 
the experimental material itself on choice patterns. In fact, in experiments 1 to 3 the obtained 
results showed that color (or pattern) was a more compelling evidence than shape in 
determining participants’ choices. The combination of line curvature and orientation used in 
experiment 4 proved to be the more balanced among those employed in the present 
research. Only in this last experiment, indeed, the type of evidence did not affect the choice 
for the confirmed alternative, nor the amount of errors. The results we found supported our 
experimental claims showing that confirmation relations can affect probability judgments 
even in absence of any semantic element, but also suggested the existence of a mutual 
influence between perceptual features and probability judgments. Our experimental results 
have theoretical as well as applied implications. On a theoretical level, they extend the results 
coming from works involving verbal and linguistic material to perceptual stimuli with no 
semantic background. Additionally, they show that high-level relations, which are 
completely unknown to the subject, affect the way people perceive relations within a visual 
set of perceptual items. This might have interesting and noteworthy implications for studies 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This work is aimed at investigating whether and how confirmation relations affect 
probabilistic inferences with perceptual material. Evidence of the effect of confirmation 
relations on probability judgments has already been found in the literature (Paperno et al., 
2014; Tentori, Chater and Crupi, 2016) in works involving verbal stimuli and linguistic 
corpora. However, no evidence of this effect on probabilistic reasoning with perceptual 
material has been found so far. In order to tackle this issue, the present work involves 
concepts and experimental methodologies coming from epistemology, psychology and 
psychophysics. In Chapter 2, I will introduce and compare contributions from epistemology 
and psychology to the understanding of probabilistic reasoning; the first part will discuss 
psychological approaches to probability judgment and the second one will present 
confirmation measures and their role in Bayesian epistemology. In the last section of this 
chapter, I will present works aimed at comparing directly these two concepts. In Chapter 3, 
I will discuss an issue that I believe would benefit from a multidisciplinary investigation 
involving philosophy, psychology and psychophysics: the Bayesian brain hypothesis. In 
Chapter 4, I will present four behavioral experiments aimed at testing the hypotheses we 
derived from the literature discussed, and finally, in Chapter 5, I will consider our 
experimental results in light of the existing literature and discuss the strengths and 
limitations of the present study, as well as further developments and theoretical or practical 




1.1 Theoretical background 
When exploring the surrounding environment, people generate hypotheses and 
collect information to test them. This process involves deductive as well as inductive 
reasoning: people extract hypotheses and rules through induction, then they combine 
inductive inferences and deduction to create anticipations on the environment based on 
these rules (see Cherubini, 2005). Deductive reasoning can be defined as that type of 
reasoning which, given true premises, yields conclusions that are necessarily true. Both 
inductive and deductive reasoning increase knowledge and provide new information, but 
new empirical knowledge is only acquired by means of inductive reasoning, which goes 
beyond the information given to draw novel conclusions. Such conclusions are probable but 
not logically implied in the already existing evidence: this new knowledge, then, is uncertain. 
In light of this, the main goal of a theory of inductive reasoning would be to define when some 
inference is strong or not, for example assigning a certain value to it. 
Any inductive inference concerns the relation between two conceptually related but 
dissociable elements: the hypothesis of interest (h) and the available evidence (e) (Tentori, 
Chater, & Crupi, 2016). When evaluating an inductive argument, one can focus on the 
hypothesis and ask how probable it is in light of the evidence; this is the posterior probability 
of h given e and Bayes rule represents its normative benchmark. One can also choose to focus 
on the evidence and ask how much the evidence e increases/decreases the belief in h; this is 
the impact, or degree of confirmation, of e over h and, in the Bayesian framework, it is 
quantified by confirmation measures. In the epistemological literature, confirmation 
measures are also referred to as measures of evidential support and in this work I will use 
the two terms interchangeably. Evidential support is a relative notion measuring the change 
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in someone’s belief; posterior probability, on the other hand, represents its absolute 
counterpart. These two elements are usually associated in everyday life: if the probability of 
a certain hypothesis h is high given a piece of evidence e, conversely it is also likely that the 
evidential impact of e on the probability of h will be high. However, they can be disentangled: 
in experimental settings, it is possible to construct inferential arguments composed of a 
hypothesis h and an evidence e where the probability of the hypothesis is high in light of the 
evidence, but the latter disconfirms the former, or vice versa. According to some recent 
explanatory accounts of reasoning biases (e.g. Crupi, Fitelson, & Tentori, 2008), this was the 
case in Kahneman and Tversky’s first investigations of probabilistic reasoning (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1982, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These first experiments involved 
probabilistic scenarios in which the probability-driven hypothesis, considered the 
normatively correct one, and the confirmation-driven one would always diverge; as just 
argued, this is unlikely in most everyday situations. Tversky & Kahneman’s (1974) 
explanation for their findings was that people are poor statistical reasoners and that their 
intuitions are normatively wrong. More precisely, they claimed that when making judgments 
under uncertainty, people employ heuristics principles, “which reduce the complex tasks of 
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). However, these experimental findings are counterbalanced by evidence 
of sound probabilistic reasoning in more naturalistic settings suggesting that maybe there is 
some element in the experimental task affecting reasoning performances. Tentori, Chater 
and Crupi (2016)’s confirmation-based account suggested that participants’ performance in 
inferential tasks is apparently suboptimal because it is driven by confirmation relations that 
make it depart from the normative benchmark. This crucial distinction between probability 
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and impact judgment has been discussed only recently; in the past, in psychology and 
cognitive science, literature has mainly focused on the assessment of posterior probability, 
giving much less attention to the estimation of evidential impact except for some recent 
experimental works (Crupi et al., 2008; Tentori et al., 2016; Tentori, Crupi, & Russo, 2013).  
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Chapter 2: Psychological and philosophical approaches to probabilistic reasoning 
 
2.1. Probabilistic reasoning: psychological approach 
In psychology, experimental investigation of inductive reasoning mainly focused on 
posterior probability. Posterior probability measures the probability of a given hypothesis in 
light of some information and it can be estimated by means of Bayes rule, which is a “formula 
that allows us to compute change in belief in a set of hypotheses, H, as a result of 
encountering some information, D (data)” (Manktelow, 2012). One possible formulation of 






The prior knowledge that hypothesis H is true is combined with the likelihood of the 
evidence to derive an estimate of the posterior probability that hypothesis H is true given 
the evidence D; to perform normatively correct judgments, people must know all these 
values and be able to combine them in the right way. For years, literature on probabilistic 
reasoning has shown that people are not capable of optimal probabilistic reasoning in 
experimental setting (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, 1982, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and 
that they are subjected to so-called reasoning biases. However, there is a discrepancy 
between these classical studies and more recent research reporting sound probabilistic 
performance with naturalistic material (see Domurat et al., 2015; Griffiths, Kemp, & 




2.1.1 Recent accounts of probabilistic reasoning 
In standard treatments of probability, the conditional probability of a hypothesis 
given an evidence Pr(H|D) is defined as the ratio of Pr(A⋂B) to Pr(B) (Zhao et al., 2009). 
However, in everyday life, some of the estimates that Bayes theorem requires might be 
unavailable, or the computations it entails could be too complicated to perform, leading to 
apparently suboptimal performance. Despite this, people’s probabilistic reasoning usually 
leads to optimal and sound behavior. Literature on probabilistic reasoning described and 
discussed several models of apparent suboptimality which still lead to sound inference, each 
entailing different computations and notions. To understand whether the mind implicitly 
computes conditional probability by means of the normatively correct equation, Zhao, Shah, 
& Osherson (2009) investigated the provenance of judgments of conditional probability and 
provided evidence for non-normative reasoning. Their work involved three behavioral 
experiments aimed at understanding whether estimates of Pr(A|B) (conditional probability) 
come from an implicit calculation of Pr(A⋂B)/Pr(B), which would be the normative 
benchmark, or they derive from other, simpler computations. Experiments 1 and 2 employed 
the same stimuli: in these experiments, participants were shown a number of sets of 
geometric shapes on a computer screen; each set was composed of a certain number of 
triangles, circles and squares in blue, red and green. In Experiment 1, after seeing each set of 
stimuli, participants had to answer questions about prior and conditional probabilities in the 
set, both presented as probability questions and as frequency questions. These questions 
probed Pr(B), Pr(A⋂B) and Pr(A|B). Experiment 2 involved the same experimental sets and 
questions, as well as an additional question that queried Pr(¬A⋂B). Experiment 3 was 
implemented on Amazon Mechanical Turk, involved scenarios describing future events and 
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the four queries introduced in Experiments 1 and 2 (Pr(B), Pr(A⋂B), Pr(A|B), and 
Pr(¬A⋂B). Each participant was invited to supply his personal probability for each of the 
statements they were shown. The first experiment showed that conditional probability does 
not come from the normatively correct rule, while Experiment 2 suggested an equation that 
more accurately described it. Finally, Experiment 3 evaluated the same hypotheses tested in 
Experiments 1 and 2 in the context of subjective estimates of future events. Overall, then, the 
three studies showed that probability judgments do not originate from mental computations 
entailed by the standard definition of posterior probability involving Bayes rule and 
provided an alternative account of the computations people perform when asked to estimate 
conditional probability. The relevance of this study for our goals is twofold. First, it suggests 
that standard computations of probability do not account for actual judgments of conditional 
probability; second, the experimental task involves perceptual material (i.e. bidimensional 
grids of figures defined by color and shape), which deviates from usual stimuli involved in 
thinking and reasoning experiments (inductive arguments in verbal form) and does not 
provide any kind of semantic information.  
An alternative explanation for suboptimal reasoning entailed linear additive instead 
of multiplicative integration of priors and evidence. Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman (2009) 
suggested that ‘normative’ probability judgments are not a necessary requisite for rational 
decisions and that violations of probability theory do not imply suboptimal decision making 
(i.e. cognitive biases like conjunction error or base rate neglect). They carried out 5  
simulations focused, respectively, on the extent to which estimates generated by a model 
implementing weighted linear additive integration and a model combining noisy 
probabilities by applying the conjunction rule of probability theory correspond with true 
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conjunctive probabilities (Study 1), on exploring if the results from Simulation Study 1 held 
also with a more general conceptualization of the random error in the judgment process 
(Study 2), on understanding whether good prediction of the criterion with suboptimal 
weights is also possible with linear additive weighting of probabilities (Study 3), on testing 
how well four models describe decisions based on conjunctive probabilities (Study 4) and 
on whether Bayes’ theorem is a better tool for using noisy probabilities to estimate a true 
posterior probability than linear additive integration (Study 5). Taken together, the studies 
showed that reasoning based on approximate rather than exact knowledge of probabilities 
and linear additive integration rather than multiplicative represent satisfying solutions in 
everyday life and they can be as accurate as estimates based on probability theory. The 
authors discussed the reported results suggesting that people could be more prone to using 
weighted additive rather than multiplicative integration of information, which can lead to 
reasoning biases. This finding shows that despite the lack of possibility or incentive to align 
to probability rules in everyday life, people’s reasoning might be still efficient thanks to 
linear additive integration. However, this strategy deviates from the normative benchmark, 
i.e., probability theory, therefore is normatively suboptimal.  
In a more recent work involving a novel estimation task, Acerbi, Vijayakumar, & 
Wolpert (2014) investigated how people combine sensory information with statistics 
collected from prior experience to yield more or less optimal behavior and, more precisely, 
how priors affect Bayesian computations with explicitly provided probabilistic information. 
To do so, a behavioral estimation task was used to probe the sources of suboptimality in 
probabilistic inference; given a probabilistic cue about its location, participants had to locate 
a specific, unknown target from a set of potential ones. Information consisted of a visual 
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representation of the a priori probability distribution of targets for that trial and a noisy cue 
about the actual target position. A model-free analysis was performed on participants’ 
performance and showed that it was suboptimal; next, a model with a factorial approach was 
applied to the data. This model consisted of the combination of four basic factors: decision 
making, cue-estimation sensory noise, noisy estimation of the prior, and lapse. The results 
showed that participants’ performance was qualitatively in line with Bayesian rules, 
although suboptimal; this suboptimality was relatively independent from the priors and 
level of noise in the cue but strongly affected by the class of distribution (i.e. the specific 
shape of the prior). Subjects’ performance, then, was driven by a combination of (noisy) 
estimation of the parameters of the priors and noisy posteriors and would not align with 
models of stochastic behavior like probability matching or sample-averaging.  
By means of two behavioral experiments and an analytical study, Domurat et al. 
(2015) provided further evidence for suboptimal but satisfactory probabilistic reasoning in 
everyday life. They investigated how often people’s probability estimates conform to Bayes 
rule when natural sampling is involved and showed that using Bayes’ rule is not necessary 
to make choices that satisfy it. Experiments 1 and 2 involved 16 computer tasks, composed 
of a learning stage and a choice stage. During the learning stage, participants could gather 
information about the environment and develop hypotheses about probabilistic 
relationship. Three kinds of information could be learned through natural sampling: prior 
occurrences, likelihood ratios and Bayesian estimates (conditional probabilities). Then, 
participants would have to use this information in the following phase to carry out choices 
conforming to Bayes rule. While experiment 1 relied on computer-based tasks, experiment 
2 also collected participants’ verbal protocols. Finally, study 3 exclusively relied on computer 
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simulations. The goal of this final experiment was to investigate how often strategies causing 
fallacious responses (representativeness, evidence-only, pre-Bayesian) lead to the same 
response as Bayes rule. This experiment involved computer simulations of the probabilistic 
scenarios from studies 1 and 2; all combinations of the information that could be gathered 
(priors, likelihoods) were generated, in order to explore whether no Bayesian-strategies 
could provide results as good as the normative ones. The authors analyzed the simulated 
strategies with regard to (1) different frequencies expressing decision-makers’ natural 
sampling experiences and (2) different base rates, arbitrarily defined as rare [P(H) ≤ 0.25], 
frequent [P(H) ≥ 0.75], and medium [0.25 < P(H) < 0.75]. The analysis of these simulated 
scenarios showed that representativeness and evidence-only strategies lead to choices in 
line with Bayes rule if base rates are high and the natural sampling size is low. This means 
that, under specific circumstances and elementary situations, even heuristic strategies can 
handle probabilistic tasks effectively (as already pointed out by Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Overall, this paper showed that Bayesian inference could be unnecessary in making 
correct choices in elementary situations through natural sampling.  
Evidence supporting the efficacy of an overall ‘suboptimal’ strategy also came from 
Laquitaine & Gardner (2018), who tested whether Bayesian processes can explain people’s 
behavior in a motion direction estimation and a spatial orientation tasks. Several different 
models were proposed to describe human behavior and compared to the Basic Bayesian one, 
involving optimal integration between priors and sensory likelihoods. The results showed 
that one of the alternative models, the Switching observer, described subjects’ estimates 
better than the Basic Bayesian observer, indeed providing the best description. The 
Switching observer model represents priors and likelihood like the Bayesian observer, but 
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instead of multiplying the two distributions, it switches between estimates chosen from the 
prior distribution and from sensory likelihood (hence its name), providing bimodal estimate 
distributions as a result. Finally, Sanborn & Chater (2016) provided an explanation for non-
normative computations based on sampling processes. They addressed the dissociation 
between good reasoning in everyday life and poor performance in probabilistic 
experimental tasks suggesting that people are not ‘ideal Bayesian reasoners’ but they are 
Bayesian samplers working with a local sense of relative posterior probabilities and not with 
explicit Bayesian calculations. According to the authors, some phenomena observable in the 
human behavior, such as reasoning fallacies, stochasticity and autocorrelation, represent 
‘traces’ of this sampling process. 
 
2.2 Confirmation measures and their role in Bayesian epistemology 
Works from psychology, decision making and behavioral economics highlighted and 
discussed the relevant role of posterior probability in decision making under uncertainty; on 
the other hand, when assessing the soundness of inductive arguments or the value of 
information, evidential impact is a crucial notion. In the psychological literature, the first 
notion was always given more attention than the latter, which, on the other hand, was a 
central concept for philosophers and epistemologists. In the epistemological literature, 
‘confirmation’ defines the support that a certain piece of evidence provides towards a 
hypothesis. Thus, confirmation theory is “the study of the logic by which scientific 
hypotheses may be confirmed or disconfirmed (or supported or refuted) by evidence” 
(Hawthorne, 2011). In Eells & Fitelson ’s (2002) words, “Measures of evidential support […] 
are supposed to quantify the degree to which a piece of evidence E provides, intuitively 
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speaking, “evidence for or against” or “support for or against” a hypothesis H – in an 
incremental as opposed to a final or absolute way” . Contemporary epistemology found in 
the Bayesian approach to probability a fitting candidate for uncertainty assessment, as it 
allows to mathematically quantify the degree of confirmation (or degree of belief) that a 
piece of evidence e provides for a hypothesis H in terms of mathematical probabilities 
(Hartmann & Sprenger, 2010).  In this approach, indeed, confirmation is defined by the 
relationship between the conditional probability of a hypothesis h towards an evidence and 
prior probability of h.  Estimation of confirmatory power is crucial in an inductive reasoning 
framework: after Carnap’s formalization of ‘confirmation’ (Carnap, 1950), a large number of 
alternative measures of confirmation have been proposed and discussed in the 
epistemological literature (for a review of the different confirmation measures see Crupi, 
Tentori, & Gonzalez, 2007; Eells & Fitelson, 2002; Fitelson, 1999; Good, 1984; Tentori, Crupi, 
Bonini, & Osherson, 2007). 
2.2.1. Psychology of inductive reasoning 
One exception to this lack of interest for evidential impact in psychological research 
is the investigation of categorical induction. Categorical induction is the process allowing 
people to “arrive at a statement of their confidence that a conclusion category has a predicate 
after being told that one or more premise categories do” (Sloman & Lagnado, 2005). In this 
context, being able to estimate the strength or soundness of an argument is crucial. In the 
last twenty years, several explanatory accounts for inductive reasoning have been proposed. 
Heit (1998) provided a first Bayesian analysis of inductive reasoning showing how Bayes 
Theorem can be applied to evaluating an inductive argument; here, Bayesian analysis would 
rely on three assumptions to explain basic phenomena in inductive reasoning like similarity, 
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typicality, and diversity effects as well as phenomena related to meaningful properties. This 
work addressed basic phenomena in inductive reasoning such as similarity, typicality and 
diversity effects. Heit’s (1998) model was further discussed and empirically tested by 
Sanjana & Tenenbaum (2003), who described a Bayesian model of the probability of 
generalization which they tested on three data sets. They compared the relative ranking of 
the strengths of all arguments predicted by three theoretical models and provided by human 
participants and found that the Bayesian model showed a based rational foundation and 
quantitative advantage over the best similarity-models. A further formalization of induction 
as a form of Bayesian statistical inference over structured probabilistic models of the world 
was proposed by Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp (2006), who discussed inductive learning 
and reasoning in computational terms focusing on generalization, property induction and 
causal inference. To conclude, a review by Hayes et al. (2010) highlighted two relevant 
directions in research on induction. First, they point out the increasing attention that more 
articulated formal models are gaining, thanks to their explanatory power; second, they 
acknowledge that induction researchers are striving to examine the links between induction 
and other cognitive processes, thus turning their attention to a broader range of phenomena. 
Overall, these works showed that probabilistic reasoning in everyday life is 
characterized by strategies that are normatively suboptimal but work well in a ‘less than 
ideal’ context. In the literature, different explanatory accounts of suboptimality have been 




2.2.2. Confirmation measures and surprisals 
After almost exclusively focusing on the investigation of posterior probability for 
decades, in recent years psychologists have started to empirically test confirmation 
measures and compare them to probability judgments, moving the abovementioned 
theoretical investigation to a more empirical level. For example, Tentori, Crupi, Bonini, & 
Osherson (2007) described alternative measures of confirmation, discussed their normative 
appeal and compared their adequacy as description of confirmation judgments in a 
probabilistic context. After outlining some properties of these measures, the authors carried 
out an experimental test to compare their adequacy with respect to different formal criteria. 
For the experimental test, they set up an urn and ball task derived from early experiments in 
probability judgments to identify which of the confirmation measures corresponded most 
closely to evidential impact judgments provided by the participants. The results obtained 
showed that only one confirmation measure among those considered could satisfy necessary 
conditions on normative adequacy but warned about needing further research to 
understand its descriptive adequacy. Interestingly, the authors noted that people proved 
able to distinguish between posteriors and degrees of confirmation and suggested that 
evidential impact might be psychologically prior to probability. This hypothesis was then 
applied to conjunction fallacy (Crupi et al., 2008) and tested empirically on corpora-based 
predictions (Paperno, Marelli, Tentori, & Baroni, 2014) and inductive arguments (Tentori et 
al., 2016).  We believe that also other works provided confirmation-based explanations for 
apparently suboptimal reasoning, labelling them in other ways. Itti & Baldi (2009) 
investigated how Bayesian surprise attracts attention by means of eye movements; to test 
their hypothesis, the authors recorded eye movements of experimental subjects while they 
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watched a series of videoclips portraying dynamic natural scenes. While watching, 
participants were instructed to “follow the stimuli’s main actors and actions, so that their 
gaze shifts reflected an active search for nonspecific information of subjective interest” (Itti 
& Baldi, 2009). By means of eye tracking data, the authors collected information on saliency, 
dynamic and surprise which allowed them to formalize a Bayesian definition of surprise “as 
the distance between the posterior and prior distributions of beliefs over models” (Itti & 
Baldi, 2009) based on two crucial concepts: uncertainty and relativeness. In light of these 
two features, a consistent definition of surprise must involve probabilities to cope with 
uncertainty, and prior and posterior distributions to reflect subjective expectations. The 
authors refer to “units of surprise” to quantify the variation between a prior probability and 
a conditional probability and for which, they believe, a quantitative measurement does not 
exist. However, in light of their definition of surprise we can consider it as a measure of 
distance and an intrinsically relative, comparative concept and relate it to confirmation. This 
idea of surprise was reprised by Prime & Shultz (2011) to explain the discrepancy between 
experimental failures and optimality in everyday life in probabilistic reasoning. However, in 
this other context, surprisal represents a mathematically defined concept taken from 
information theory that, according to the authors, captures people’s intuitions about 
probability better than probability itself. In a behavioral experiment implemented on 
SurveyMonkey, the authors manipulated information (probability vs. frequency) and 
question format (probability vs. surprisal) to explore how different presentation modalities 
would affect participants’ judgments. To do so, they elaborated four versions of Bayesian 
problems each giving and asking different information (probabilities vs frequencies). 
Participants were asked to read each problem and make a posterior judgment for each of 
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them without making calculations but using their intuitive judgments instead. The results 
showed that people conform to Bayesian predictions by using both prior and likelihood 
information to update posteriors but deviate from Bayes rule when given frequency 
information and asked to provide answers in surprisals. In this case, they would use 
likelihood information but ignored prior probabilities. Overall, the effect of priors was much 
smaller than the effect of likelihoods when both were used; this tendency has already been 
described in the literature (Bar-Hillel, 1980). Overall, the authors noted that “people are 
more comfortable with judging their own surprise than with estimating probabilities even 
though “surprisals are not much used in psychological research, despite widespread 
psychological interest in manipulating and measuring surprise” (Prime & Shultz, 2011). 
According to the authors, then, surprisals are more intuitive and immediate than 
probabilities but at the same time they are scarcely used in psychological research; based on 
these two features, it is possible to draw a comparison between them and confirmation 
measures. 
2.2.3. Probability and reasoning biases 
Classic research in probabilistic reasoning, like the works from Kahneman & Tversky 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981), argued that human 
reasoners’ probability judgments systematically diverge from the normative benchmark and 
that people use suboptimal and biased strategies. In fact, a large part of the psychological 
literature on the topic has focused on describing and discussing a set of phenomena, so called 
reasoning biases, which were interpreted as suboptimal strategies of probabilistic 
reasoning. In an influential work, Tversky & Kahneman (1974) suggested that “people rely 
on a limited number of heuristic principles by which they reduce the complex tasks of 
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assessing likelihoods and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations”. They 
described four heuristics that are commonly employed to assess likelihoods and predict 
values (representativeness, availability, adjustment and anchoring), presented systematic 
biases to which these heuristics lead and discussed applied and theoretical implications. The 
authors ascribed heuristic judgments to limited cognitive resources and distinguished them 
from emotional and motivational factors affecting judgment. As already pointed out, the task 
environment of these early works contrasted with real life settings as it was often 
characterized by a deliberate dissociation between probability and confirmation.  
During the years, several explanations for suboptimal reasoning have been proposed 
and discussed. Some of them relied on pragmatic issues and some others on cognitive 
heuristics; for the goals of the present research, I will focus on the information theoretic 
account proposed by Crupi and Tentori (Crupi et al., 2007; Crupi et al., 2008; Tentori, Chater 
and Crupi, 2016) which implies that evidential impact plays a crucial role in probabilistic 
inference. 
 
2.3. Confirmation relations as possible explanations for reasoning biases 
Evidential impact has been used to explain and contextualize some phenomena that 
classical experiments on probabilistic reasoning mentioned above tended to label as biases. 
One relevant example is conjunction fallacy, defined as the tendency “to regard a conjunctive 
event as more probable than one of its components, contrary to the conjunction rule of 
probability theory” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973, 1982) caused by reliance on the 
representativeness heuristic. Some recent works presented the conjunction fallacy as an 
impact-driven probabilistic judgment conflicting with the normative benchmarks that 
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classical works on probabilistic reasoning relied on. In a theoretical note aimed at discussing 
fallacious probability judgments entailed by this phenomenon, Crupi et al. (2008) provided 
an explanatory account based on the suggestion that these fallacious judgments are guided 
by sound assessment of confirmation relations (see Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002). 
After describing the relationship between confirmation and probability in inductive logic 
and in the psychology of induction, the authors compared their confirmation-theoretic 
explanatory account to other relevant alternatives. From a theoretical point of view, the 
authors suggest that in reasoning biases like the conjunction fallacy, the notion of 
confirmation could overcome that of probability. Additionally, intuitive assessments of 
confirmation can be elicited directly and people can distinguish between probability and 
confirmation, as suggested in a more empirical work (Tentori et al., 2007). This 
confirmation-theoretic account was further investigated in a following study (Tentori et al., 
2013) involving four experiments sharing the same basic procedure but with different 
elicitation procedures for confirmation and probability judgments, different experimental 
designs, classes of problems and content. The results of all four experiments supported the 
information-theoretic account and showed that “the perceived degree of confirmation […] 
performed better than its perceived probability as a predictor of the occurrence and 
prevalence of the conjunction fallacy” (p.247). Moreover, when probability and confirmation 
were disentangled, the latter systematically prevailed as a determinant of the conjunction 
fallacy, indicating that inductive confirmation holds a crucial role in this phenomenon and 
further corroborating the confirmation-based explanation. Additionally, the authors pointed 
out that the results presented in this work could not be explained by alternative accounts 
like the ones discussed before. As mentioned before, some of these accounts seem more 
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compelling and provide more detailed explanations than others do. In the next paragraph, I 
will present further evidence in line with the confirmation-based one proposed by Tentori 
et al. (2016). This same approach will also represent the theoretical basis for my 
experimental investigation of how confirmation and probability affect perceptual 
probabilistic inferences. 
 
2.4. Combining evidential impact and probability judgments in psychological research 
Classic works on probabilistic reasoning seemed to show that people did not perform 
well in experimental settings, whereas they had no problem with reasoning tasks in real life. 
Additionally, people seem to perform better in perceptuo-motor tasks than in cognitive 
decisions; for example, Jarvstad, Hahn, Warren, & Rushton (2014) addressed the issue 
suggesting that this dissociation might be due to several noise sources. By means of two 
experiments involving a perceptuo-motor task, the authors discovered that optimality was 
task dependent and thus statements about optimality should be more cautious. These two 
experiments involved an implicit as well as an explicit motor choice task and showed that 
participants’ perceptuo-motor choices might deviate from optimality in two ways. First, they 
appear to prioritize speed over precision in the speed-accuracy trade-off; second, their 
precision criteria are less strict when aiming for larger targets. 
Another explanatory account is the abovementioned confirmation-based one. In the 
last few years, some papers tried to compare directly confirmation and probability 
judgments to test which of the two is more accurate, coherent, and stable in time and 
therefore more likely to be the basis for probabilistic inference. I will focus on two relevant 
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works, the first coming from a linguistics background and working with corpus-based data 
and the other one from a psychological background and involving real life arguments. 
Paperno et al. (2014) demonstrated that confirmation affects human judgments on 
word co-occurrence likelihood. The aim of this work was to test whether corpus-based 
estimations are predictive of human intuitions on word probabilities. Three experiments 
involving different material but with a common experimental paradigm and procedure were 
ran. In all three of them, participants were asked to perform a forced choice between two 
candidate target words in the context of another word. Participants were asked to be as 
accurate as possible and to provide confidence ratings. Experimental stimuli were based on 
word co-occurrence data from a large text collection. Experiment 1 represented the first 
investigation of the effects of the confirmation between words on their perceived 
probability, comparing target pairs with equal conditional probabilities. Under these 
conditions, if participants’ probability judgments were only driven by conditional 
probability, the choice rate for either target was expected to be at chance level. On the 
contrary, if confirmation relations affected probability judgments, participants’ choice 
should be influenced by the evidential impact of context on target. Experiment 2 aimed at 
extending Experiment 1’s investigation to a more general setting in which the two targets 
were not matched with respect to the conditional probability of the target in light of the 
context. To investigate whether and how confirmation values could affect likelihood 
judgment with targets whose posterior probabilities differed, Experiment 2 involved a 
random sample of items from the corpus where probability and confirmation varied freely, 
and used both variables as predictors in a regression analysis on participants’ choices. 
Experiment 3 aimed at testing the effects described above under more controlled conditions. 
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In all three experiments, the authors found that confirmation consistently affected human 
judgments on word co-occurrence likelihood. The theoretical contributions of this work are 
manifold. First, it illustrated the usefulness of linguistic corpora as a source of probability 
and confirmation values implicit in language data; second, it contributed to the study of word 
association in linguistics; finally, it provided further evidence that speakers are sensitive to 
very subtle statistical patterns present in corpora.  
The crucial role of confirmation relations in probability judgments was further 
explored with different experimental stimuli by Tentori, Chater and Crupi (2016) aimed at 
comparing the reliability of impact versus probability judgments in inductive inference. The 
goal of this study was to investigate whether impact judgments are more consistent and 
stable in time than probability estimates and to compare the reliability of impact versus 
probability judgments. To test this hypothesis, a paper and pencil experiment was carried 
out. Before the main experiment, a preliminary study was conducted to obtain response 
frequencies for real word arguments in order to derive objective probabilities and impact 
values to judge in the main experiment. Impact values were computed according to three 
different measures: probability ratio, likelihood ratio and relative distance. In a second 
phase, objective probabilities and impact values were used to generate 56 arguments by 
combining two complementary pieces of evidence with 28 hypotheses. Two pieces of 
evidence were used for each hypothesis to have an identical number of arguments with 
positive and negative impact. The proper task for each participant consisted in reading all 
the 56 arguments and judging the probability of the hypothesis in light of the evidence given 
and the impact of the evidence on the hypothesis. These judgments were repeated twice by 
every subject with an interval of around 7 days to obtain a time-consistency measure. The 
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results showed that impact judgments were more consistent in time than probability 
judgments, independently from the measure considered. Impact judgments were also more 
correlated with objective probabilities computed from the preliminary survey than it was 
posterior probability. In general, these results suggest that impact judgments are more 
accurate and stable in time than posterior probability: they might be a more primitive type 
of judgment and might be the basis of probabilistic inference. These results align with older, 
theoretical works on confirmation measures discussed above showing that people are 
sensitive to the distinction between confirmation and probability. 
 
2.5. Probabilities in perception and psychophysics 
2.5.1. Statistical regularities in visual perception 
The two abovementioned works by Paperno et al. (2014) and Tentori et al. (2016) 
investigated the effect of confirmation relations with verbal and linguistic material; as 
mentioned in the introduction, the goal of the present work is to understand whether and 
how confirmation relations affect probabilistic inferences even when perceptual (e.g. visual) 
material is at issue. Literature on visual perception often showed how it relies a lot on the 
identification and encoding of statistical features of the scene and how people can extract 
statistical measures over a variety of visual properties (Allan, Hannah, Crump, & Siegel, 
2008; Ariely, 2001; Hannah, Crump, Allan, & Siegel, 2009; Yang, Tokita, & Ishiguchi, 2018; 
Zhao, Ngo, Mckendrick, & Turk-browne, 2011). Examples of this ability appear in works on 
ensemble statistics perception, exploring how the visual system naturally represents sets of 
similar items using summary statistics. In a review of works on summary statistical 
perception, Haberman & Whitney (2012) presented a variety of domains in which people 
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are able to integrate or ensemble-code low level feature information, like position, size, 
orientation, or shadow. Ariely (2001) investigated the idea of set representation and 
explored whether the visual system creates a specific representation for a set of similar 
objects or it just encodes the sum of the representations of the individual items. To answer 
this question, two novel tasks were employed: member discrimination and mean 
identification. The first task measured knowledge about the sizes of individual spots in a set, 
whereas the second one measured sensitivity to the mean size of a set. In member-
identification experiments, participants appeared to be unable to distinguish test spots that 
were in the set from those that were not and their performance was only marginally better 
than chance: in this task, observers did not seem to be able to make accurate judgments 
regarding parts of a set. In mean-discrimination experiments, on the other hand, participants 
reported much more accurate performances. Overall, then, the results of the mean 
discrimination experiments were characterized by a high level of accuracy, whereas 
member-identification tasks were not. Ariely (2001) provided an explanation for these 
results based on set representation, suggesting that the representation of a set is something 
more than a composition of its single parts and that people can extract statistical properties 
of a display. This set representation proposal was further explored by Corbett & Oriet (2011) 
in four behavioral experiments, involving the two tasks introduced by Ariely (2001) in 
combination with a RSVP (rapid serial visual presentation) paradigm. Overall, the results 
showed that explicit encoding of individual items is not necessary to build a mean 
representation of a set, further corroborating the statistical averaging hypothesis. Human 
participants, indeed, proved to be able to extract a representation of the mean size of a set of 
perceptual stimuli, but performed poorly when asked to determine whether a certain item 
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was a member of this set. Taken together, these two results suggest that the visual system 
represents the overall statistical properties of sets of objects. Statistical representations, in 
turn, allow to perceive statistical regularities, which spontaneously guide and attract 
attention (Zhao, Al-Aidroos, & Turk-Browne, 2013) and reduce perceived numerosity by 
means of grouping mechanisms (Zhao & Yu, 2016).  
The works from Ariely (2001) and Corbett and Oriet (2011) involved items 
characterized by one-dimensional features; multidimensional items, instead, are common in 
studies on visual statistical learning. Despite sharing their conceptual foundations (visual 
statistical processing), statistical summary perception and statistical learning are different 
processes: statistical summary perception involves the extraction of summary statistics over 
sets of objects; statistical learning, instead, involves the extraction of relationships among 
individual objects over repeated experience (Zhao et al., 2011). As I will describe in the next 
paragraph, these relationships have been conceptualized in different ways; I propose that 
confirmation relations could be one of them. 
2.5.2. Parallels between contingency and confirmation relations 
Confirmation and contingency relations seem to present several parallels and 
similarities from a formal and operational point of view; in light of this, an interesting 
hypothesis could be that the notion of confirmation relation can inform works on 
contingency judgments and help explain their results.  
Contingency judgment tasks have been present in the literature since the eighties 
(Allan, 1980; Allan & Jenkins, 1983; Allan et al., 2008; Baker, Berbrier, & Vallee-tourangeau, 
1989; Shanks, 1985); however, a crucial turning point is represented by the so-called 
streamed-trial paradigm which was first used by Crump, Hannah, Allan, & Hord (2007). They 
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ran a behavioral experiment involving two types of judgments in a within-subject design: 
contingency and frequency ratings, related to sets of perceptual stimuli. This work 
established a novel procedure for measuring contingency judgments and replicated two 
central findings in contingency judgment literature: the dependence of contingency 
judgments on ∆P and on outcome density. ∆P represents a common measure for contingency 
and it is defined by the difference between the probability of an outcome given the cue and 
the probability of the same outcome in absence of the cue: 𝑃(𝑂|𝐶) − 𝑃(𝑂|¬𝐶) . This equation 
is formally equivalent to confirmation measure n (Nozick, 1981): 𝑛(𝑒, 𝐻) = Pr(𝑒|𝐻) −
𝑃𝑟(𝑒|¬𝐻). In light of this equivalence, the parallel between confirmation and contingency 
measures already suggested represents a viable interpretation. Consequently, one could 
interpret the works on contingency judgments in terms of people assessing confirmation 
relations. Allan, Hannah, Crump, & Siegel (2008) further tested the streamed-trial paradigm 
in a series of four experiments, again investigating contingency assessment. In the four 
experiments, participants were asked to categorize the contingency between two items as 
either weak or strong, thus making a binary choice. Overall, these four experiments showed 
that parameters such as contingency sign, outcome density and payoffs affected decision 
criteria but not sensitivity to contingency and, more generally, that the streamed-trial task 
represented a viable methodology for contingency assessment. While discussing the results, 
the authors raise an interesting point: given that “psychophysics is the study of the 
relationship between physical events and our internal experience of these physical events” 
(Allan & Siegel, 2002), contingency judgments should represent a central research topic for 
psychophysics but this does not appear to be the case. Finally, Hannah et al. (2009) used the 
same streamed-trial procedure but modified it to investigate cue-interaction effect, which 
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arises from pairing multiple cues with a common outcome: in this situation, people behave 
as if these cues interacted with each other instead of treating them independently. Once 
again, contingency was presented and computed in terms of ∆P measure. By means of three 
behavioral experiments involving geometric forms and more meaningful images implying 
some background knowledge, the authors were able to show that the streamed-trial 
procedure can be extended to the study of cue-interaction and that it can be used with 
different experimental materials. The works mentioned so far do not provide Bayesian 
explanatory accounts; McKenzie & Mikkelsen (2007), instead, proposed a Bayesian view of 
covariation assessment to explain two phenomena frequently found in covariation 
judgment: overestimating the weight of joint presence and underestimating the weight of 
joint absence and influence of prior beliefs on the variables’ relationship judgment. Both 
phenomena represent departures from the normative model, but they are consistent with a 
Bayesian interpretation of the task. The authors presented the results of two behavioral 
experiments aimed at understanding whether the abovementioned phenomena appear in 
empirical judgments. These experiments revealed an inversion in the “cell A bias” (i.e. 
overestimating the weight of joint presence) when participants are led to believe that 
absence (instead of presence) is rare: cell D (joint absence) is then considered the most 
informative, in line with a Bayesian approach. While sensitivity to prior beliefs is a sign that 
people assess covariation in a “Bayes-like” way, sensitivity to rarity provides evidence for 
sensitivity to likelihoods and, consequently, one could infer, to confirmation relations. These 
results suggest that people take an inferential approach to covariation tasks instead of a 
descriptive one. That is, they try to assess the likelihood that there is a relationship between 
the variables involved. Because of this, they will tend to focus on instances of joint presence 
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(cell A) and discard those of joint absence (Cell D). In a descriptive approach, instead, people 
would only focus on the four cell values without assuming any other external knowledge and 
considering all cells equally informative. In such a scenario, “cell A bias” would represent a 
deviation from the norm; however, in the inferential one preference for joint presence and 
the influence of prior probability generate from normative processes. Taken together, the 
results of both experiments provide empirical evidence for an inferential approach to 
covariation tasks providing further evidence for sound, despite not normative, inferences: 
“taking into account real-world conditions, combined with normative principles that make 
sense under these conditions, can help explain why people behave as they do” (McKenzie & 
Mikkelsen, 2007). Finally, Leshinskaya and Thompson-Schill (2018) found that participants 
in a statistical learning task involving perceptual stimuli are sensitive to not only the 
conditional probability between two events, but also the uniqueness of that relation. Once 
again, ∆P was used as measure of association; to test whether learners were sensitive to 
uniqueness in a visual statistical learning (VSL) task, the authors manipulated the 
uniqueness of a strongly predictive event pair in event sequences composed of animated 
events. To do so, they created low ∆P and high ∆P sequences. In the first case, they increased 
the conditional probability of the effect by having it follow two other events and itself more 
often than in the high ∆P sequence. Thus, the two conditions differed in terms of how 
uniquely the cause, rather than other events, predicted the effect. A first behavioral 
experiment carried out on Amazon Mechanical Turk involved a cover task in which 
participants were asked to identify the “common” versus “rare” version of each event type 
and showed that participants reported a weaker representation of the cause-effect 
relationship in the low ∆P condition; conversely, the high ∆P condition allowed participants 
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to notice the predictive pattern. A second experiment was carried out to test the possibility 
that participants’ performance could be affected by having only two alternative causes or 
many alternative causes for a frequent effect and showed that the amount and entity of 
alternative causes did not affect learning of the effect-cause relation. The key finding was 
that participants in a statistical learning task were sensitive to not only the conditional 
probability between two events, but also the uniqueness of that relation: uniqueness, then, 
could represent a crucial element also in associative learning and causal reasoning. 
Additionally, the authors found that the computation of such uniqueness happened 
incidentally and automatically, making it “the way we register the naturally occurring 
statistics of our observed world” (Leshinskaya and Thompson-Schill, 2018). Similarly, as 
proposed by Tentori et al. (2016), the perception of confirmation relations is also automatic 
and spontaneous. 
Overall, these works showed parallels between the notion of contingency judgment 
and that of confirmation relations at a theoretical and empirical level. Thus, I propose that 
they represent analogous concepts in two different literatures and theoretical frameworks. 
That is, when performing contingency judgment tasks with streamed-trial or other 
procedures, people could base their answers on confirmation relations. It is also possible to 
draw a parallel between these studies and those reporting optimal probabilistic reasoning 
with apparently suboptimal computations, the common point being confirmation relations.   
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Chapter 3: The cognition-perception boundary:  Bayesian brain hypothesis 
 
Investigation of posterior probability and evidential impact has consequences and 
implications for a variety of topics which go beyond thinking and judgment specifically. In 
the last twenty years, probabilistic models of cognitive processes have gotten more and more 
popular and Bayesian probability theory has provided valuable contributions to different 
theoretical and empirical lines of research and scientific disciplines because it provides a 
theoretical framework for dealing with reasoning under uncertainty. A recent and 
widespread hypothesis is that of the so-called Bayesian brain (Knill & Pouget, 2004; Sanborn 
& Chater, 2016; Seriès & Seitz, 2013). According to this hypothesis, the brain represents 
sensory information in the form of probability distributions (Knill & Pouget, 2004) and “can 
be conceptualized as a probability machine that constantly makes predictions about the 
world and then updates them based on what it receives from the senses” (De Ridder, 
Vanneste, & Freeman, 2014). The Bayesian brain hypothesis has been applied to several low 
and high level processes like visual perception (Mamassian, Landy and Maloney, 2002), 
multisensory perception (Beierholm, Quartz and Shams, 2009), sensorimotor control 
(Körding & Wolpert, 2006), inductive learning (Tenenbaum et al., 2006). At a general level, 
it is well known in psychology, psychophysics and neuroscience that the nervous system of 
humans and animals developed to be sensitive to the statistical properties of the 
environment. Additionally, there is extensive evidence (e.g. see Beck et al., 2008; Chan, Niv, 
and Norman, 2016; Spratling, 2016; Vossel et al., 2015; and Wei and Stocker, 2012) in 
cognitive neuroscience and biology showing how probabilistic updating provides an almost 
perfect descriptive model for basic neural processes like vision and other kinds of perception 
by framing them in terms of probabilistic inferences over underlying probability 
37 
 
distributions. Some computations are easier to frame in probabilistic terms than others: 
standard Bayesian models describe lower level processes more accurately than higher level 
ones. Indeed, plenty of such models have been proposed and tested in the last years for 
mechanisms like visual perception, attention and search, multisensory perception, 
perceptual decision making. 
In light of the evidence coming from neuroscience and visual perception, there seems 
to be a discrepancy between normative benchmarks and people’s reasoning performances; 
additionally, “People are Bayesians who fail to solve simple Bayesian word problems” 
(Sirota, Vallée-tourangeau, & Vallée-tourangeau, 2015). In other terms, people lack the 
ability to introspect about cognitive operations that are otherwise carried out in an optimal 
way in everyday life (Chater, Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 2006). This dissociation is reflected in 
two different approaches to the study of probabilistic reasoning involving different 
paradigms and apparently reaching different, if not opposite, conclusions. The first approach 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) showed that people fail in simple Bayesian reasoning tasks, 
whereas a much more recent one (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006; Sanborn & Chater, 2016; 
Tenenbaum et al., 2006) reported sound Bayesian reasoning in a variety of tasks. One work 
following this second approach (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006) examined human cognition 
in more realistic context than laboratory studies and found that everyday cognitive 
judgments follow optimal statistical principles and align with the ‘real’ statistics in the world. 
This work discussed a behavioral experiment comparing ideal Bayesian analyses with the 
judgments of a large sample of participants, examining whether people’s predictions were 
sensitive to the distributions of different quantities that arise in everyday contexts and 
whether they corresponded to optimal statistical inference in different settings. In the 
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experiment, participants were asked to make predictions about five different phenomena 
(movie grosses, poem lengths, life spans, reigns of pharaohs, and lengths of marriages). Each 
prediction was based on one of five possible values, varied randomly between subjects. In 
each case, participants read several sentences establishing context and then were asked to 
give their predictions. People’s judgments appeared to be close to the predictions coming 
from the Bayesian model across different settings, suggesting that people might be capable 
of considering prior distributions and update them in light of real world statistics.  
 
3.2. Bayesian updating in perception and cognition 
As discussed in the previous paragraph, plenty of studies focused on Bayesian 
reasoning with perceptual (e.g. visual) material as Bayesian inference is particularly suitable 
to model visual perception in terms of unconscious inference. Moreover, representing 
knowledge in terms of probability distributions is particularly suitable for low and high-level 
tasks involving uncertainty. Körding & Wolpert (2006) reviewed studies investigating the 
mechanisms involved in decision problems and action selection tasks, showed that human 
behavior aligns with Bayesian decision theory predictions and concluded that Bayesian 
decision theory represents a coherent framework for decisions involved in sensorimotor 
tasks. This framework can be applied to visual perception: Moreno-bote, Knill, & Pouget 
(2011) investigated whether visual percepts originate from Bayesian sampling, that is, 
sampling from probability distributions over image interpretations and showed that visual 
dominance in bistable perception behaves as a probability, supporting the idea of Bayesian 
sampling over a probability distribution. Bistable perception leads people to experience 
spontaneously perceptual alternation between two compelling interpretation of one single 
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stimulus and represents one clear example of the interpretive nature of vision (Meng & Tong, 
2004). As to more complex processes, Feldman (2014) reviewed Bayesian models of 
perceptual organization, first introducing the topic of Bayesian inference and then 
illustrating its application to perceptual organization problems. For our goals, the crucial 
part of this work is the definition of perception as unconscious inference, which explains why 
Bayesian inference has been proposed as a solution to this problem. Bayesian inference, 
indeed, deals with the notion of conditional probability (which we have defined above) in 
situations of uncertainty; thus, it represents an optimal candidate to model the central 
problem of perception which is to estimate physical world based on perceptual data. 
Rescorla (2015) provided a similar explanatory account and discussed the explanatory 
power and usefulness of mental representation in Bayesian perceptual models. If perception 
is framed as unconscious inference, expectations are a crucial element as they can be 
considered as prior beliefs in the inferential process (Seriès & Seitz, 2013). This idea is 
particularly relevant for the present work as it aims at drawing a parallel between inferential 
reasoning with verbal stimuli and visual perception. In their discussion of object perception 
as Bayesian inference, Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille (2004) ‘motivated’ the Bayesian 
framework by once again framing perception as ‘unconscious inference’ in which one of the 
central goals is to make sense of ambiguity. In light of this conceptual framework, supporting 
psychophysical evidence and neural implications of the Bayesian approach to object 
perception are then discussed. Overall, the evidence provided in the paper suggests that the 
Bayesian framework is a fruitful scheme for studying object perception and presents several 
advantages, as it allows to explicitly model uncertainty, define ideal observers (and 
performance), and develop quantitative theories at the information processing level, and it 
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applies to different areas such as language, speech, concepts and reasoning. A review by 
Seriès and Seitz (2013) discussed recent studies on motion perception in light of the 
perceptual Bayesian reasoning framework. The authors discussed how expectations can be 
described as probabilistic priors in a Bayesian updating framework and proposed two 
different types of effect on perception: expectations can modulate perceptual performance 
or they can alter the content of perception (i.e. the perceptual appearance of sensory inputs). 
In another review of Bayesian models of cognition, Chater, Oaksford, Hahn, & Heit (2010) 
describe perception as a ‘prototypical’ example of Bayesian inference because it aims at 
assigning probabilities to each possible interpretation of a percept, based on prior 
knowledge and sensory input. The Bayesian approach to perception is consistent with the 
idea that perception is “analysis by synthesis” (see also Yuille and Kersten, 2006); this means 
that the interpretation of perceptual data is the result of a combination of bottom up and top 
down processes. The idea of integration of priors and likelihood appears in the explanation 
of several different perceptual mechanisms as well as some other higher level ones. As 
Pouget and colleagues (2013) pointed out, “real-life problems are almost always far too 
complicated to allow for optimal behavior” and, as to visual perception, “natural images are 
both complex and objectively ambiguous” (Yuille & Kersten, 2006). In these cases, the brain 
might use heuristics or approximations: this is what makes behavior often suboptimal; other 
sources of suboptimality lie in the coding of sensory information and combination of sensory, 
perceptual and cognitive factors (Knill & Pouget, 2004). To deal with uncertainty, the brain 
models sensory data as conditional probability functions over a set of unknown variables.  
The idea of suboptimal inference appeared not only in decision making to explain cognitive 
biases, but also when describing perceptual decision making. According to Beck et al. (2012), 
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suboptimal inference plays a relevant role in behavioral variability together with noise, 
especially when dealing with complex tasks. In these cases, the brain exploits computational 
shortcuts; therefore, most of behavioral variability comes from suboptimal inference due to 
these shortcuts. As to visual perception, it must be noted that the visual system treats 
perceptual sets with items varying along one dimension or more dimensions (i.e. 
conjunction of features). With stimuli varying along only one dimension (size, orientation) 
the overall statistics that can be computed are average, standard error and such, as described 
in the previous chapter. If stimuli represent the conjunction of two features, the computable 
overall statistics also include assessing relations between the two features across the set of 
objects. In Utochkin, Khvostov and Stakina (2018)’s words, “The variety of conjunctions as a 
function of their constituent feature statistics can be described in terms of inter-feature 
correlation. The correlation (or any other concordance measure) is an effective way to 
estimate how likely certain features in one dimension go with certain features in another 
dimension” (p.179). This idea of inter-feature correlation resonates a lot with the definition 
of visual statistical learning as “extraction of relationships among individual objects over 
repeated experience” outlined in the previous chapter; however, while the former seems to 
involve individual features, the latter explicitly mentions inter-object relations. Regardless 
of the level at which they work, both notions represent some kind of association between 
two items; given this assumption, a parallel can be drawn between inter-feature correlation 





Even though the Bayesian approach seems to provide a useful theoretical framework 
for the investigation of high and low level cognitive processes, some have raised critiques 
and observations about it as well as some doubts on its application to cognitive processes. In 
a review, Hahn (2014) distinguished three sets of criticism, by Jones and Love (2011), 
Elqayam and Evans (2011) and Bowers and Davis (2012a). These critiques focused on the 
unclear psychological implications of the model, its excessive flexibility with parameters and 
consequent unfalsifiability and its weak neuroscientific evidence. Jones & Love (2011) 
compared Bayesian approach to other psychological theories like behaviorism and 
evolutionary psychology, criticizing their use of optimality assumption. According to this 
work, explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition can 
be easily brought back to already existing theories. The authors do not deny the importance 
and theoretical interest of Bayesian approach, but they warn against what they call ‘Bayesian 
fundamentalism’. With this term, they referred to some research track whose primary goal 
is to “has been to demonstrate that human behavior in some task is rational with respect to 
a particular choice of Bayesian model” and which “strictly adheres to the tenet that human 
behavior can be explained through rational analysis […] without recourse to process, 
representation, resource limitations, or physiological or developmental data” (Jones & Love, 
2011). Elaqayam & Evans (2011), instead, focused their criticism on normativism, “defined 
as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be 
measured and judged” and showed how this approach can lead to biased inference and does 
not represent a significant improvement to already existing computational level-analysis. 
Finally, Bowers & Davis (2012b) in their reply to Griffiths, Chater, Norris and Pouget (2012) 
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criticized the large use of optimality claims by Bayesian researchers and raised three main 
arguments. First, they showed that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in 
psychology is weak; second, that this evidence is even weaker in neuroscience and finally 
they discussed the general Bayesian approach in cognitive science. According to Hahn 
(2014), these critiques are placed at the wrong level of generality: despite being motivated 
by specific models, the criticizing papers were misdirected as general critiques of a whole 
paradigm. Despite these criticisms, the Bayesian brain hypothesis still represents a very 
popular and widespread interpretation of lower and higher level cognitive processes. 
As already mentioned, the two concepts of posterior probability and evidential 
impact are intrinsically related, and one implies the other: therefore, investigating whether 
and how they interact in perceptual probabilistic judgments would be useful and desirable 
and it could potentially cast light on some noteworthy phenomena, which goes beyond pure 
reasoning issues. At a more applied level, jointly understanding these two notions would be 
crucial for better understanding lower level processes (e.g. visual perception and search). 
 
3.4. Experimental questions 
As already mentioned, the hypothesis that the present  thesis was aimed to test is that 
confirmation relations represent a viable explanatory account for apparently suboptimal 
probabilistic reasoning, both with verbal material (Tentori, Chater and Crupi, 2016) and 
perceptual stimuli. This experimental question is explicitly based on the confirmation-based 
model proposed by Tentori et al. (2016) but, at the same time, it can also inform the Bayesian 
brain Hypothesis. Indeed, if the brain “can be conceptualized as a probability machine that 
constantly makes predictions about the world and then updates them based on what it 
44 
 
receives from the senses” (De Ridder et al., 2014) then instances of suboptimality could stem 
from humans using confirmation as a proxy for probability in their prediction-making 
process. 
In light of the relevant role of impact on probability judgements, there are still open 
questions regarding the exploration of how people judge the posterior probability of a 
hypothesis Pr(h|e) and the impact of new evidence on such hypothesis Imp(h,e) in inductive 
inferences. For example, if we found that confirmation relations affect probability judgments 
even when perceptual material is at issue then it would mean that this relation also holds 
when no semantic content and no background knowledge is involved. The studies on 
contingency judgment cited in Chapter 2 already provide some evidence for confirmation-
driven computations: in these works, in fact, people’s judgments would often depend on ∆P, 
which is a confirmation measure itself. Most studies on contingency judgment do not adopt 
a completely abstract and blank experimental backstory, but they often involve some 
fictitious scenario (see Chapman & Robbins, 1990; Exp.2 in Hannah et al., 2009; Mandel & 
Lehman, 1998; and Vadillo, Miller & Matute, 2005). Because of this, it is possible to speculate 
that semantic background knowledge could still be involved. Additionally, to the best of my 
knowledge, none of these works has tried to empirically disentangle contingency and 
probability relations in order to explore whether one notion is more compelling than the 
other in driving judgments. To sum up, the theoretical background and empirical evidence 
discussed so far showed that confirmation relations affect probability judgments with verbal 
stimuli and word association judgments with linguistic corpora; the present dissertation 
aims at extending these results to a different context involving abstract, symbolic material. 
If we found significant effects even when perceptual stimuli are at issue, this would mean 
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that the effect is transversal to at least three different experimental materials and is present 
even when background, semantic information is not available. With respect to the Bayesian 
models discussed above, this would mean that instead of turning to ‘heuristic’ shortcuts, 
people are indeed using Bayesian strategies (one could say that they ‘are Bayesian’), but 
their focus is on confirmation relations instead of probability ‘absolute’ values.  
3.4.1 Hypothesis 
We operationalized the abovementioned experimental question in two hypotheses: a 
general one and a more in-depth one. In light of the first hypothesis, we expect participants 
to consider confirmed hypotheses more probable than corresponding (in terms of posterior 
probability) disconfirmed ones. If this were the case, it would mean that keeping all 
conditions constant, participants are influenced by confirmation relations despite being 
asked to perform a perceptual probabilistic task. As to the second hypothesis, we expect 
participants to choose the more likely option (i.e. the normatively correct one) more often 
when it is confirmed by the evidence provided than when it is disconfirmed. If this were the 
case, it would mean that in spite of being unaware of the conflict between impact-driven and 
normatively correct option, participants are affected by it when performing the task. 
Additionally, we also expect participants to be driven by confirmation relations when a 
normatively correct answer is absent. Finally, we expect different posterior probability 
levels to differently affect people’s performance in the experimental task. 
3.4.2 Strategy 
To answer our experimental question and test the abovementioned hypotheses we 
ran four behavioral, computer-based experiments. They all shared the same underlying 
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hypothesis and experimental paradigm but each of them involved different perceptual 




Chapter 4: Experimental studies 
Four behavioral computer-based experiments were conducted using the same 
methodology. All experimental stimuli were controlled using MATLAB and the Psychophysics 
toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  
4.1 Experiment 1 
4.1.1. Introduction 
As discussed in the theoretical introduction, the few empirical works presenting a 
direct comparison between confirmation and probability estimates mostly involved verbal 
material and linguistic corpora. This kind of experimental material could raise issues related 
to the effect of previous information or semantic content on participants’ performance; 
therefore, in order to minimize any background knowledge effect, we chose simple, 
perceptual features like color and shape. This first experiment represents a first exploration 
of whether and how evidential impact affects probability judgments when low-level features 
are at issue. 
4.1.2. Method 
Participants 
Participants were 40 students of the University of Trento (25% men, mean age= 24, 
SD= 2.8). The study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Trento, and 
informed consent was obtained for all participants. The sample size was calculated with 
G*Power (Version 3.1.5.1 Institut für Experimentelle Psychologie, Düsseldorf, Germany) 
assuming an effect size of 0.55, a α of 0.05, and a power of 0.8 (1–β). To determine the effect 
size, we chose to slightly overestimate the average effect size found in psychology (d= 0.4) 
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in light of the high effect sizes (average d = 1.65) reported in a previous study by Tentori et 
al. (2016). The minimal sample size computed by this method was 28, therefore we aimed 
at recruiting at least 30 participants for experiment. However, in Experiment 1 we chose to 
recruit a much larger number as it represented a first exploration of the issue and were not 
sure that the task would be easily understandable by all participants. Having obtained 
satisfying performance from participants in Experiment 1, we kept a minimum of 30 
participants in the following ones. 
Material and Procedure 
Experimental stimuli consisted of inductive arguments concerning 40 sets of figures 
that had two features (e.g., a geometric shape and a color) with two possible values each 
(e.g., triangle or circle and white or black). The kinds of figures, their number, and their 
presentation time varied across experiments. Figures 3 to 6 in the appendix report all the 40 
sets used in Experiment 1 as an example. As shown in Figure 2, features could be just 
displayed and/or verbally described, since for some of them, as pattern (Exp 3) line 
orientation or curvature (Exp 4), it was not possible to find an intuitive graphic 
representation that was uninformative about the levels of the other feature. By varying the 
probabilistic association between the two values of the features, we orthogonally 
manipulated posterior probability [three levels: .5-.5, .55-.45, and .6-.4] and impact [two 
levels: positive vs. negative]. A detailed description of experimental sets is provided in Figure 
1. Sets were generated in order to have, for each possible combination of the two features, 
two arguments with the same posteriors and opposite impacts (i.e., equal in absolute 
strength but different in sign). This means that each value of the two features counted as 
evidence in 10 sets, and it was positively associated (in 5 sets, set “b” in Figure 1) and 
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negatively associated (in 5 sets, set “c” in Figure 1) to the same level of the other feature, 
while keeping the posterior probability constant. As shown in Figure 2, in each trial, 
participants were first presented with a set of figures that had two features with two possible 
values each (i.e., white or black color and circular or triangular shape in Exp. 1, striped or 
dotted pattern and circular or triangular shape in Exp. 2, for examples, see 1a and 2a, 
respectively). At the end of the presentation time, a figure was drawn from the set and the 
value of one of its features was revealed (i.e., “black” in 1b). In light of this evidence, 
participants had to report their expectation about the value of the other feature of the figure 
by selecting one of the two icons at the bottom of the screen (which counted as alternative 
hypotheses, i.e., “circle” vs. “triangle” in 1b). Participants were instructed to be as fast and 
accurate as possible and had 30 seconds to submit their answer. No immediate feedback on 
the accuracy of their responses was provided. Once the response was provided, the selected 
alternative appeared in the center of the screen for 1.5 seconds, and participants were 
prompted to press the spacebar to proceed with the next trial.  Each set of figures was 
presented twice, for a total of 80 trials, with a 30 seconds break after every 20 trials. The 
experimental trials were preceded by four training trials. The presentation order of the trials 
was fully randomized. Participants were tested individually. At the end of the task, 
participants earned €0.15 for each correct answer. It is important to underline that the 
presentation modality is always above awareness level; this is relevant because, as 
demonstrated by Tapia, Breitmeyer, and Shooner (2010), among others, stimuli are 
processed at an individual-feature level at the nonconoscious level, but at a whole-object 
level while at the conscious level. By presenting all visual scenes for 3 to 4 seconds, we aimed 
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at minimizing the probability that subjects would perceive only one of the two features 
composing each item. 
 
Figure 1: examples of experimental sets. In each contingency table, rows represent the two possible evidences and 
columns represent the two hypotheses. Pr: posterior probability; L: evidential impact, according to L confirmation measure 
(Kemeny & Oppenheim, 1952). In set a, the two hypotheses (white and black) have the same posterior probability in light 
of the evidence “triangle”; thus, there is no normatively correct answer. However, evidence “triangle” provides positive 
support for hypothesis “black” and negative support for hypothesis “white”. In set b, the posterior probability of hypothesis 
“white” in light of evidence “triangle” is higher than that of hypothesis “black”. However, evidence ”triangle” provides 
positive support for hypothesis “black” and negative support for hypothesis “white”.  In this set, then, the evidence provided 
disconfirms the more likely alternative. In set c, the posterior probability of hypothesis “black” in light of evidence “triangle” 
is higher than that of hypothesis white, and evidence ”triangle” provides positive support for hypothesis “black” and 
negative support for hypothesis “white”. In this set, the evidence provided also confirms the more likely alternative. 
For a complete list of the experimental sets involved in Experiment 1, see Appendix. Experiment 2 involved the same sets 
but white was replaced with “light gray” and black with “dark gray”. In Experiments 3 and 4, we halved the number of 





Figure 2: visual description of the experimental task. Participants were seated in a dimly illuminated room 60 cm 
from the monitor (1920x1080 resolution, 100 Hz). The generation and presentation of the stimuli was controlled by using 
Matlab and Psychtoolbox-3 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). All the items of a given set were inscribed in a 2.6° by 2.6° square. 
Rectangles 1a to 1c and 2a to 2c exemplify experiments 1 and 3 respectively. The structure of experiment 2 was analogous 
to that of experiment 1 and experiment 4 was analogous to experiment 3. Features could be just displayed and/or verbally 
described, since for some of them, as pattern (exp 3) line orientation or curvature (exp 4), it was not possible to find an 
intuitive graphic representation that was uninformative about the levels of the other feature. 
4.1.3. Data analysis 
The same analytical strategy was employed for the four experiments. First, for each 
participant, we computed the proportion of choices for the confirmed alternative out of the 
total number of trials. In order to investigate if this proportion was higher than chance, we 
performed a one-sample t-test (against .5). Second, only for trials in which posterior 
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probability differed from .5 (that is, trials in which there is a normatively correct response), 
we compared the proportions of errors for confirmed versus disconfirmed alternatives. 
More specifically, for each participant, we computed the proportions of choices for the less 
likely alternative out of the total amount of trials in which the evidence confirmed the more 
likely hypothesis and out of the total amount of trials in which the evidence disconfirmed the 
more likely hypothesis. These two proportions were then compared using a paired sample 
t-test. Third, a GEE regression analysis was used to model the effect of posterior probability 
and type of evidence (i.e., the feature provided as evidence) on choices for the confirmed 
alternative. Both factors were included in the analysis as categorical independent variables. 
Fourth, a GEE regression analysis was carried out to ascertain the effect of impact direction, 
posterior probability, and type of evidence on errors. All three factors were included in the 
analysis as categorical independent variables. When needed, we compared the number of 
choices for the confirmed alternative (or of errors) within specific sub-classes of stimuli 
using post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction of the p values. These four 
analyses were repeated also for consistent trials that is only for trials in which the participant 
provided the same answer to the same two sets of figures. Data analysis was conducted using 








Table 1. Mean proportions of choice for the confirmed alternative in Experiment 1 
Posterior 
Probability 
 All trials 
Consistent  
trials 
Evidence Prop. Prop. % 
0.5-0.5 Shape    
 Triangle .52 .56 65 
 Circle .48 .44 44 
 Color    
 Black .57 .69 44 
 White .69 .81 66 
0.55-0.45 Shape    
 Triangle .52 .58 64 
 Circle .41 .28 45 
 Color    
 Black .68 .72 69 
 White .74 .89 57 
0.6-0.4 Shape    
 Triangle .48 .49 67 
 Circle .32 .15 50 
 Color    
 Black .74 .83 68 
 White .71 .72 77 
Overall   .57 .60 61 
 
“Prop.” stands for the mean proportion of choices for the confirmed alternative across participants in all trials (column “All 
trials”) or consistent trials only (column “Consistent trials”). These proportions have been computed by averaging the 
proportion of choices for the confirmed option provided by each participant in each subclass of stimuli. “%” stands for the 








All trials  Consistent trials 
Disconfirmed Confirmed  Disconfirmed  Confirmed 
Prop. Prop.  Prop. %  Prop. % 
0.55-0.45  Shape         
  Triangle .38 .33  .34 61  .28 66  
  Circle .37 .56  .20 42  .62 47  
  Color         
  Black .61 .24  .61 66   .17 72  
  White .71 .23  .90 54   .8 61  
0.6-0.4  Shape         
  Triangle .27 .31  .20 70   .19 65  
  Circle .28 .64  .14 59   .85 41  
  Color         
  Black .67 .19  .71 69   .4 67  
  White .57 .14  .55 71   .7 84  
Overall    .48 .33  .46 62   .27 63  
 
“Prop.” stands for the mean proportion of errors across participants in trials in which the more likely hypothesis was 
disconfirmed (column “Disconfirmed”) or confirmed (column “Confirmed”) by the evidence, when all trials (column “All 
trials”) or only consistent trials (column “Consistent trials”) are considered. These proportions have been computed by 
averaging the proportion of errors made by each participant in each subclass of stimuli. “%” stands for the percentage of 
consistent trials out of the total amounts of trials in which the more likely hypothesis was disconfirmed (column 
“Disconfirmed”) or confirmed (column “Confirmed”) by the evidence in each subclass of stimuli. 
 
Table 1 and 2 report the percentage of choices for the confirmed alternative (Table1 
1) and the percentage of errors (Table 2), in each of the sub-classes of stimuli. The one 
sample t-test revealed that the proportion of choices for the confirmed alternative out of the 
total number of trials (M = .57, SD = .14) was significantly higher than chance level [t(39) = 
3.34, p = .002]. Coherently with this result, the paired sample t-test revealed that the 
proportion of errors out of the total number of trials was greater when impact and posterior 
probability were dissociated, that is when the more likely hypothesis was disconfirmed 
rather than confirmed by the evidence [M = .48, SD = .15, and M = .33, SD = .15, respectively, 
t(39) = 3.54, p = .001]. The results of the GEE regression analysis on choices for the 
confirmed alternative showed that the type of evidence was a significant predictor [χ2(1) = 
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49.49, p < .001] while posterior probability was not [χ2(2) = 2.10, p = .350]. More 
specifically, across various posteriors levels, participants showed an increase of choices for 
the confirmed alternative when the type of evidence provided was color rather than shape 
(M = .69, SE = .027, and M = .46, SE = .027; post-hoc test: p < .001). The GEE also showed a 
significant interaction between type of evidence and posterior probability [χ2(2) = 16.39, p 
< .001]. As shown in Table 2, the frequency of choices for the confirmed alternative tended 
to increase consistently with the increase of the posterior probability of the more likely 
hypothesis. However, when the evidence concerned the shape of the figure such tendency 
was significantly reversed. Participants showed a lower number of choices for the confirmed 
alternative with .60-.40 posterior (M = .40, SE = .025) rather than with .55-.45 (M = .47, SE 
= .03) and .50-.50 (M = .50, SE = .036) posteriors (post-hoc tests: p =.035, and p = .002, 
respectively). 
The GEE regression analysis on errors showed that impact direction and posterior 
probability were both significant factors [χ2(1) = 12.21, p < .001, and χ2(1) = 9.22, p = .002,  
respectively], while type of evidence was not (p = .837). As expected, participants showed a 
decrease of errors when the evidence confirmed rather than disconfirmed the more likely 
hypothesis (M = .32, SE = .025, and M  = .48, SE = .026, respectively; post-hoc test: p < .001), 
and with .60-.40 posteriors rather than with .55-.45 posteriors (M  = .37, SE = .017, and M 
= .42, SE =.013, respectively; post-hoc test: p < .001). Significant interaction effects were 
obtained between impact direction and type of evidence [χ2(1) = 62.43, p < .001], and 
among all three factors [χ2(1) = 5.89, p = .015]. Across posterior probability levels, when 
the type of evidence was shape, the frequency of errors was slightly greater when the 
evidence confirmed rather than disconfirmed the more likely hypothesis (M = .46, SE = .031, 
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and M = .33, SE = .031, respectively; post-hoc test: p = .046). Such a difference, however, 
was significant only with .6-.4 posteriors (M = .48, SE = .033, and M = .28, SE = .034, 
respectively; post-hoc test: p = .001). 
Table 3.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of choices for the 
confirmed alternative (all trials) in Experiment 1 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) ,538 ,1395 ,264 ,811 ,000 
posterior= 0.6-0.41 ,440 ,1573 ,131 ,748 ,005 
posterior= 0.55-0.451 ,362 ,1445 ,079 ,646 ,012 
type_of_evidence2 -,525 ,1813 -,880 -,170 ,004 
1 reference category: 0.5-0.5 
2reference category: color 
 
Table 4.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of errors (all 
trials) in Experiment 1 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) ,647 ,1564 ,340 ,953 ,000 
posterior 3 -,162 ,1747 -,505 ,180 ,353 
type_of_evidence2 -1,144 ,2213 -1,578 -,710 ,000 
impact_direction4 -1,830 ,2945 -2,408 -1,253 ,000 
2reference category: color 
3reference category: 0.55-0.45 
4reference category: negative 
 
A very similar pattern of results was obtained when only consistent trials were 
considered. The proportion of choices for the confirmed alternative (M = .60, SD = .21) was 
significantly higher than chance level [t(39) = 3.02, p = .004], and the proportion of errors 
was greater when the more likely hypothesis was disconfirmed by the evidence than when 
it was confirmed [M = .46, SD = .26, and M = .27, SD = .24, respectively, t(39)= 2.93, p = 
.006]. Type of evidence resulted a significant factor [χ2(1) = 50.34, p < .001] in predicting 
choices for the confirmed alternative, while posterior probability did not [χ2(2) = 5.08, p = 
.079]. Again, the interaction effect between the two factors was significant [χ2(2) = 8.67, p = 
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.013]. The GEE analysis on errors reported significant effects of posterior probability [χ2(1) 
= 6.53, p = .011] and impact direction [χ2(1) = 10.45, p < .001], but not of type of evidence, 
(p = .813). The only significant interaction effect proved to be the one between impact 
direction and type of evidence [χ2(1) = 67.81, p < .001]. 
Table 5. Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of choices for the 
confirmed alternative (consistent trials) in Experiment 1 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1,039 ,3065 ,438 1,640 ,001 
posterior= 0.6-0.41 ,419 ,2904 -,150 ,988 ,149 
posterior= 0.55-0.451 ,565 ,2882 ,000 1,130 ,050 
type_of_evidence2 -1,016 ,3672 -1,736 -,296 ,006 
1 reference category: 0.5-0.5 
2reference category: color 
 
Table 6.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of errors 
(consistent trials) in Experiment 1 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1,155 ,2718 ,622 1,688 ,000 
posterior3 -,448 ,2559 -,950 ,053 ,080 
type_of_evidence2 -2,175 ,4090 -2,976 -1,373 ,000 
impact_direction4 -3,321 ,5348 -4,370 -2,273 ,000 
2reference category: color 
3reference category: 0.55-0.45 
4reference category: negative 
 
4.1.5. Discussion 
In line with our hypothesis, participants systematically chose the confirmed 
alternative over the equally probable, but disconfirmed one, and chose the normatively 
incorrect (i.e. less likely) alternative more often when it was confirmed (vs. disconfirmed) 
by the evidence provided. However, the type of evidence being tested appeared to affect 
choice patterns significantly and interacted with the relative posterior probabilities and 
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impact direction. That is, participants’ choice patterns appeared to be affected by impact 
relations only when the more salient feature (in this case, color) was provided as evidence. 
 These results provided a first empirical evidence of the effect of confirmation 
relations on probability judgment with perceptual stimuli, but also highlighted a significant 
influence of the experimental material itself on choice patterns. In fact, in line with empirical 
findings that indicate a privileged role of color in visual search (Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004, 
2017) as well as in modulating attentional capture (Adamo, Wozny, Pratt, & Ferber, 2010), 
the obtained results showed that color was a more compelling evidence than shape in 
determining participants’ choices. 
 
4.2. Experiment 2 
4.2.1. Introduction 
Having found that the task was easily understandable by all participants, we reduced 
the sample size. Additionally, having noticed that color represented a more compelling 
evidence than shape, we still used it as one of the two crucial features of each item, but in an 
attempt to make it less salient than before we used two shades of gray (dark and light) 
instead of black and white. Lastly, we added a thick, bright green rim to each item to make 
its shape more salient. The purpose was to force participants to also pay attention to the 






Participants were 30 students of the University of Trento (33% men, mean age= 22, 
SD = 2.8). The study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Trento, and 
informed consent was obtained for all participants. 
Material and Procedure 
 The experimental procedure was analogous to that described in Experiment 1, with 
the changes mentioned in the introduction: each item presented in the visual sets 
represented the conjunction of shape (triangle/circle) and color (dark/light gray). 
4.2.3. Data analysis 
The analytical strategy was analogous to that described in Experiment 1.  
4.2.4. Results 
 
Table 7. Mean proportions of choice for the confirmed alternative in Experiment 2 
Posterior 
Probability 
 All trials 
Consistent  
trials 
Evidence Prop. Prop. % 
0.5-0.5 Shape  
  
 Triangle .47 .46 58 
 Circle .44 .38 60 
 Color    
 Dark .71 .79 62 
 Light .70 .78 72 
0.55-0.45 Shape    
 Triangle .45 .44 58 
 Circle .39 .31 59 
 Color    
 Dark .75 .87 65 
 Light .67 .78 65 
0.6-0.4 Shape    
 Triangle .38 .31 68 
 Circle .37 .30 65 
 Color    
 Dark .74 .86 68 
 Light .71 .78 69 
Overall  
 
.56 .60 64 
 
“Prop.” stands for the mean proportion of choices for the confirmed alternative across participants in all trials (column “All 
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trials”) or consistent trials only (column “Consistent trials”). These proportions have been computed by averaging the 
proportion of choices for the confirmed option provided by each participant in each subclass of stimuli. “%” stands for the 
percentage of consistent trials out of the total amounts of trials in each subclass of stimuli. 




All trials  Consistent trials 
Disconfirmed Confirmed  Disconfirmed  
Confirme
d 
Prop. Prop.  Prop. %  Prop. % 
0.55-0.45  Shape         
  Triangle .37 .47  .32 63  .43 53 
  Circle .27 .50  .15 70  .48 50 
  Color         
  Dark .73 .23  .90 60  .15 70 
  Light .69 .35  .79 65  .27 67 




  Triangle .19 .43  .7 75  .38 60 
  Circle .17 .43  .3 73  .36 57 
  Color         
  Dark .70 .22  .81 70  .11 65 
  Light .68 .24  .74 67  .15 72 
Overall    .47 .36  .48 68  .29 62 
 
“Prop.” stands for the mean proportion of errors across participants in trials in which the more likely hypothesis was 
disconfirmed (column “Disconfirmed”) or confirmed (column “Confirmed”) by the evidence, when all trials (column “All 
trials”) or only consistent trials (column “Consistent trials”) are considered. These proportions have been computed by 
averaging the proportion of errors made by each participant in each subclass of stimuli. “%” stands for the percentage of 
consistent trials out of the total amounts of trials in which the more likely hypothesis was disconfirmed (column 
“Disconfirmed”) or confirmed (column “Confirmed”) by the evidence in each subclass of stimuli. 
Table 7 reports the percentages of choice for the confirmed alternative within all trial 
categories out of both the total amount of trials and consistent trials only. When all trials 
were considered, the one-sample t-test showed that the proportion of confirmed choices was 
significantly higher than chance level [M = .56, SD = .16; t(29) = 2.25, p = .032]. Coherently, 
the paired samples t-test on the proportion of errors showed that this proportion was higher 
when the more probable hypothesis was disconfirmed by the evidence provided than in the 
other condition confirmed [M = .47, SD = .15, and M = .36, SD = .20], but this difference was 
not statistically significant, t(29) = 1.90, p = .067. The GEE regression analysis on choices 
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for the confirmed alternatives did not report a significant effect of posterior probability 
[χ2(2) = 1.58, p = .454] but a strong effect of the type of evidence provided [χ2(1) = 55.68, 
p < .001]. In fact, confirmed alternatives were chosen significantly more often when the 
evidence provided was color rather than shape (M = .71, SE = .038, and M = .42, SD = .028, 
respectively; post-hoc test: p < .001). The interaction between the two variables affected 
significantly the proportion of confirmed choices, χ2(2) = 9.05, p = .01]. The GEE analysis on 
the proportion of errors reported a significant effect of posterior probability [χ2(1) = 12.74, 
p < .001] and type of evidence [χ2(2) = 27.21, p < .001]. In fact, errors were less frequent 
with .6-.4 (vs .55-.45) posteriors and when shape was the evidence provided, rather than 
color. The direction of impact did not affect the proportion of errors significantly [p = .109] 
but its interaction with type of evidence did, [χ2(1) = 69.21, p < .001]. Consequently, when 
the evidence provided was shape, impact direction did not affect the proportion of errors, 
whereas when it was color, errors were more frequent when the evidence disconfirmed the 
more likely hypothesis, rather than confirm it (M = .70, SE = .042, and M = .26, SE = .042, 
respectively; post-hoc test: p < .001). Other two-way interactions effects were not found [all 
ps > .05] but the three way interaction between impact direction, posterior probability and 
type of evidence was significant, χ2(1) = 4.52, p = .034. Across posterior probability levels, 
when the type of evidence was shape, the frequency of errors was greater when the evidence 
confirmed rather than disconfirmed the more likely hypothesis (M = .46, SE = .034, and M  
= .24, SE = .029, respectively; post-hoc test: p = .001). Such a difference, however, was 
significant only with .6-.4 posteriors (confirming evidence: M = .43, SE = .040; disconfirming 





Table 9.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of choices for the 
confirmed alternative (all trials) in Experiment 2 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) ,867 ,1929 ,489 1,245 ,000 
posterior=0.6/0.41 ,102 ,1312 -,155 ,359 ,436 
posterior=0.55/0.451 ,030 ,1309 -,226 ,287 ,818 
type_of_evidence -1,034 ,2053 -1,437 -,632 ,000 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
2reference category: color 
 
Table 10.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of errors (all 
trials) in Experiment 2 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) ,908 ,2077 ,500 1,315 ,000 
posterior1 -,138 ,1727 -,477 ,200 ,423 
type_of_evidence2 -1,677 ,2753 -2,216 -1,137 ,000 
impact_direction3 -1,795 ,4055 -2,590 -1,000 ,000 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
2reference category: color 
3reference category: negative 
 
When only consistent trials were considered, the proportion of choices for the 
confirmed alternative was still significantly higher than chance level M = .59, SD = .21; t(29) 
= 2.25, p = .032]. Unlike when considering all trials, in this case the proportion of errors 
when the more probable hypothesis was disconfirmed by the evidence provided was 
significantly higher than in the other condition [M = .48, SD = .19, and M = .29, SD = .29, 
t(29) = 2.34, p = .026]. The GEE analysis on the proportion of choices for the confirmed 
alternative reported the same results as with all trials: posterior probability did not affect 
choice patterns, p = .482, but type of evidence did, χ2(1) = 44.50, p < .001. Indeed, across 
posterior probability levels, participants chose the confirmed alternative more frequently 
when the evidence provided was color (M = .82, SE = .051) rather than shape (M = .36, SE 
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= .045; post-hoc test: p < .001). The two factors did not interact significantly, p = .077. A 
GEE analysis on the effect of posterior probability, type of evidence and impact direction on 
the proportion of errors reported main effects for posterior probability and type of evidence 
[χ2(1) = 12.92, p < .001 and χ2(1) = 27.31, p <. 001, respectively] but not for impact 
direction, p = .144. As with all trials, the two- way interaction between impact direction and 
type of evidence was the only statistically significant one [χ2(1) = 45.91, p = .001]. When the 
evidence provided was shape, impact direction did not affect the proportion of errors, 
whereas when it was color, errors were more frequent when the evidence disconfirmed the 
more likely hypothesis, rather than confirm it (M = .81, SE = .061, and M = .15, SE = .051, 
respectively; post-hoc test: p < .001). Other two-way interactions effects were not found [all 
ps > .05], but the three way interaction between impact direction, posterior probability and 
type of evidence was marginally significant, χ2(1) = 4.13, p = .042. 
Table 11.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of choices for 
the confirmed alternative (consistent trials) in Experiment 2 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1,451 ,3540 ,757 2,145 ,000 
posterior=0.6/0.41 ,130 ,2312 -,323 ,583 ,575 
posterior=0.55/0.451 ,077 ,2611 -,435 ,588 ,769 
type_of_evidence2 -1,739 ,3538 -2,432 -1,045 ,000 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
2reference category: color 
 
Table 12.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of errors 
(consistent trials) in Experiment 2 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1,658 ,4650 ,747 2,570 ,000 
posterior=0.6/0.41 -,460 ,3462 -1,138 ,219 ,184 
type_of_evidence2 -2,895 ,5300 -3,934 -1,856 ,000 
Impact direction3 -3,075 ,8107 -4,664 -1,486 ,000 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
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2reference category: color 
3reference category: negative 
4.2.5. Discussion 
As in the previous experiment, choice patterns generally align with our experimental 
hypotheses but also reveal a strong effect of the feature being provided as evidence. Indeed, 
once again, the type of evidence affected the proportion of choices for the confirmed 
alternative as well as the proportion of errors, and it interacted significantly with the relative 
posterior probability for the two hypotheses and with impact direction. Overall, these results 
seem to support our hypothesis but at the same time are affected by the type of evidence 
provided even more than in the previous experiment: instead of helping participants focus 
not only on the color of all items but on their shape as well, these new features seemed to 
make color even more salient. Moreover, error patterns for those sets where shape was the 
evidence almost seemed to suggest that participants were not following any particular 
strategy when answering to those trials. 
 
4.3. Experiment 3 
4.3.1. Introduction 
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that individuals’ probability judgments 
are influenced by evidential impact also when perceptual stimuli are at issue. In order to 
avoid the asymmetry between the two perceptual features observed in both of them, we 
tried to balance the saliency of type of evidence by replacing color with pattern (i.e., lines vs. 
dots). Moreover, to simplify the perceptual task, we halved the number of figures included 
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 Participants were 32 students of the University of Trento (31% men, mean age= 20.4, 
SD = 2.2). The study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Trento, and 
informed consent was obtained for all participants. 
Material and Procedure 
 The procedure was analogous to that described in Experiment 1, with the changes 
mentioned in the Introduction; each item presented in the visual sets represented the 
conjunction of shape (triangle/circle) and pattern (lines vs dots). 
4.3.3. Data analysis 
The analytical strategy was analogous to that described in Experiment 1.  
4.3.4. Results 








Evidence Prop. Prop. % 
0.5-0.5 Shape    
 Triangle .50 .52 56 
 Circle .42 .37 56 
 Pattern    
 Lines .66 .76 61 
 Dots .69 .86 59 
0.55-0.45 Shape    
 Triangle .48 .49 61 
 Circle .54 .59 53 
 Pattern    
 Lines .61 .78 50 
 Dots .70 .53 69 
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0.6-0.4 Shape    
 Triangle .49 .47 70 
 Circle .50 .48 69 
 Pattern    
 Lines .68 .79 66 
 Dots .66 .75 66 
Overall   .58 .61 62 
 
“Prop.” stands for the mean proportion of choices for the confirmed alternative across participants in all trials (column “All 
trials”) or consistent trials only (column “Consistent trials”). These proportions have been computed by averaging the 
proportion of choices for the confirmed option provided by each participant in each subclass of stimuli. “%” stands for the 
percentage of consistent trials out of the total amounts of trials in each subclass of stimuli 
 




All trials  Consistent trials 
Disconfirmed Confirmed  Disconfirmed  Confirmed 
Prop. Prop.  Prop. %  Prop. % 
0.55-0.45  Shape         
  Triangle .35 .38  .26 61   .26 61  
  Circle .44 .37  .39 48   .25 58  
  Pattern         
  Lines .59 .34  .69 45   .16 55  
  Dots .73 .29  .83 70   .17 67  
0.6-0.4  Shape         
  Triangle .31 .34  .24 66   .30 73  
  Circle .28 .28  .21 78   .10 59  
  Pattern         
  Lines .62 .24  .72 59   .14 73  
  Dots .62 .26  .69 58   .17 73  
Overall    .49 .31  .49 61   .20 65  
 
“Prop.” stands for the mean proportion of errors across participants in trials in which the more likely hypothesis was 
disconfirmed (column “Disconfirmed”) or confirmed (column “Confirmed”) by the evidence, when all trials (column “All 
trials”) or only consistent trials (column “Consistent trials”) are considered. These proportions have been computed by 
averaging the proportion of errors made by each participant in each subclass of stimuli. “%” stands for the percentage of 
consistent trials out of the total amounts of trials in which the more likely hypothesis was disconfirmed (column 
“Disconfirmed”) or confirmed (column “Confirmed”) by the evidence in each subclass of stimuli. 
 
When all trials were considered, the one-sample t-test showed that the proportion of 
choices for the confirmed alternative (M = .58, SD = .16) was significantly higher than 
chance level [t(31) = 2.69, p = .011]. The proportion of errors when the evidence 
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disconfirmed the most likely hypothesis was significantly greater than when the evidence 
confirmed it [M = .49, SD = .18, and M = .31, SD = .18, respectively, t(31) = 3.28, p = .003]. 
The GEE regression analysis on choices for the confirmed alternative showed a strong effect 
of type of evidence [χ2(1) = 50.29, p < .001], but no significant effect of posterior probability 
[χ2(2) = .44, p = .802], and no interaction between type of evidence and probability [χ2(2) 
= 3.18, p = .204]. Across posterior probability levels, participants chose the confirmed 
alternative more frequently when the evidence provided was pattern (M = .67, SE = .027) 
rather than shape (M = .49, SE = .020; post-hoc test: p <. 001). The GEE regression analysis 
on errors showed a significant effect of impact direction [χ2(1) = 22.63, p < .001], posterior 
probability [χ2(1) = 8.01, p = .005], and type of evidence [χ2(1) = 18.10, p < .001]. 
Coherently with the results of Experiment 1, errors were less frequent when the evidence 
provided confirmed (vs. disconfirmed) the more likely hypothesis and with .6-.4 (vs. .55-.45) 
posterior. However, across posterior probability levels and regardless of impact direction, 
errors were more frequent when the type of evidence provided was pattern rather than 
shape (M = .45, SE = .023 and M = .34, SE = .019, respectively; post-hoc test: p < .001). A 
significant interaction effect between impact direction and type of evidence was also 
reported [χ2(1) = 80.67, p < .001]. When the evidence provided was pattern, the frequency 
of errors was greater when impact and posterior probability were dissociated (vs 
associated), (M = .64, SE = .023 and M = .28, SE = .032, respectively; post-hoc test: p < .001), 




Table 15.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of choices for 
the confirmed alternative (all trials) in Experiment 3 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) ,734 ,1689 ,403 1,065 ,000 
posterior= .60-.401 -,027 ,1463 -,313 ,260 ,856 
 posterior= .55-.451 -,088 ,1175 -,318 ,143 ,455 
type_of_evidence2 -,891 ,1720 -1,228 -,554 ,000 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
2reference category: pattern 
 
Table 16.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of errors (all 
trials) in Experiment 3 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) ,647 ,1039 ,443 ,850 ,000 
posterior1 -,152 ,1873 -,519 ,215 ,416 
type_of_evidence2 -1,059 ,1563 -1,365 -,752 ,000 
impact_direction3 -1,435 ,1774 -1,783 -1,087 ,000 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
2reference category: pattern 
3reference category: negative 
 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, when the analyses included only consistent trials, results strictly 
resembled those obtained when all trials were considered. The overall proportion of choices 
for the confirmed alternative (M = .61, SD =.21) was higher than chance level [t(31) = 2.91 
p = .007], and the proportion of errors was greater when the evidence disconfirmed (vs. 
confirmed) the more likely hypothesis [M = .48, SD = .25, and M = .20, SD = .24, respectively, 
t(31) = 4.17, p < .001]. Type of evidence significantly predicted choices for the confirmed 
alternatives [χ2(1) = 16.83, p < .001] whereas posterior probability [χ2(2) = .47, p = .792] 
and the interaction between type of evidence and posterior probability [χ2(2) = 3.39, p = 
.184] did not. Finally, the GEE regression analysis on errors revealed that impact direction 
[χ2(1) = 7.92, p = .005], posterior probability [χ2(1) = 5.02, p = .025], and type of evidence 
[χ2(1) = 8.87, p = .003] were all significant predictors; the only significant interaction effect 
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was between impact direction and type of evidence [χ2(1) = 26.81, p < .001]. 
Table 17.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of choices for 
the confirmed alternative (consistent trials) in Experiment 3 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1,338 ,4371 ,482 2,195 ,002 
posterior= .60-.401 -,200 ,2633 -,716 ,316 ,448 
 posterior= .55-.451 -,168 ,1909 -,542 ,206 ,378 
type_of_evidence2 -1,618 ,4177 -2,436 -,799 ,000 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
2reference category: pattern 
Table 18.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of errors 
(consistent trials) in Experiment 3 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1,210 ,3768 ,471 1,948 ,001 
posterior1 -,331 ,3251 -,968 ,307 ,309 
type_of_evidence2 -1,990 ,3481 -2,672 -1,308 ,000 
impact_direction3 -2,645 ,7069 -4,030 -1,259 ,000 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
2reference category: pattern 
3reference category: negative 
 
4.3.5. Discussion 
Despite replacing color with another feature, we still found an effect of the feature 
being provided as evidence. However, type of evidence did not interact significantly with 
posterior probability in predicting the choice for the confirmed alternative, but it interacted 
with impact direction in predicting the proportion of errors. As in Experiments 1 and 2, 
results showed that confirmed alternatives were chosen more frequently than disconfirmed 
(but equally probable) alternatives, and that evidential impact affected the choice of the 
normatively correct alternative. Unfortunately, however, the results concerning the choices 





4.4. Experiment 4 
4.4.1. Introduction 
The replacement of color with pattern aimed at eliminating the asymmetry observed 
between the two types of evidence employed in Experiments 1 and 2 was unsuccessful, and 
the results of Experiment 3 showed that also pattern was a more compelling evidence than 
shape in determining participants’ judgments. To the end of contrasting such asymmetry, in 
Experiment 4, we employed sets of figures that were characterized by the combination of 
two different features: line curvature (i.e., wavy vs. straight) and line orientation (i.e., 
horizontal vs. vertical). These two have been suggested as the simplest line features by 
Treisman and Gormican (1988), and relevant visual search attributes by Wolfe and Horowitz 
(2017). As in Experiment 2, for each trial, a set of either 23 or 24 figures (i.e., wavy vertical 
lines, wavy horizontal lines, straight vertical lines, and straight horizontal lines) was 
presented for 4,000 ms.  
4.4.2. Method 
Participants 
Participants were 32 students of the University of Trento (16% men, mean age= 22.4, 
SD= 3). The study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Trento, and 
informed consent was obtained for all participants. 
Material and procedure 
The procedure was analogous to that described in the previous experiments, with the 
changes mentioned in the Introduction. Each item of a visual set was composed of lines with 
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different orientation (vertical vs horizontal) and different curvature (wavy vs straight). 
4.3.3. Data analysis 
The analytical strategy was analogous to that described in Experiment 1.  
4.4.4. Results 








Evidence Prop. Prop. % 
0.5-0.5 Orientation    
 Horizontal .64 .82 47 
 Vertical .65 .73 55 
 Curvature    
 Wavy .53 .60 53 
 Straight .63 .77 58 
0.55-0.45 Orientation    
 Horizontal .66 .73 63 
 Vertical .63 .71 59 
 Curvature    
 Wavy .63 .73 58 
 Straight .59 .59 63 
0.6-0.4 Orientation    
 Horizontal .60 .65 66 
 Vertical .68 .77 73 
 Curvature    
 Wavy .62 .69 63 
 Straight .62 .65 66 





“Prop.” stands for the mean proportion of choices for the confirmed alternative across participants in all trials (column “All 
trials”) or consistent trials only (column “Consistent trials”). These proportions have been computed by averaging the 
proportion of choices for the confirmed option provided by each participant in each subclass of stimuli. “%” stands for the 












All trials  Consistent trials 
Disconfirmed Confirmed  Disconfirmed  Confirmed 
Prop. Prop.  Prop. %  Prop. % 
0.55-0.45  Orientation         
  Horizontal .62 .29  .67 64   .17 61  
  Vertical .55 .29  .61 58   .16 61  
  Curvature         
  Wavy .60 .34  .67 48   .26 67  
  Straight .55 .38  .55 70   .29 55  
0.6-0.4  Orientation         
  Horizontal .44 .24  .41 61   .15 70  
  Vertical .53 .16  .45 66   .8 80  
  Curvature         
  Wavy .49 .24  .52 58   .14 67  
  Straight .46 .22  .44 64   .7 69  
Overall    .53 .27  .53 61   17 66  
 
“Prop.” stands for the mean proportion of errors across participants in trials in which the more likely hypothesis was 
disconfirmed (column “Disconfirmed”) or confirmed (column “Confirmed”) by the evidence, when all trials (column “All 
trials”) or only consistent trials (column “Consistent trials”) are considered. These proportions have been computed by 
averaging the proportion of errors made by each participant in each subclass of stimuli. “%” stands for the percentage of 
consistent trials out of the total amounts of trials in which the more likely hypothesis was disconfirmed (column 
“Disconfirmed”) or confirmed (column “Confirmed”) by the evidence in each subclass of stimuli.  
 
 As in the three previous experiments, the proportion of choices for the confirmed 
alternative (M = .62, SD = .14) was significantly higher than chance level [t(31) = 4.98, p < 
.001], and the proportion of errors was greater when the most likely hypothesis was 
disconfirmed (vs. confirmed) by the evidence [M = .53, SD = .18, and M = .27, SD = .14, 
respectively, t(31) = 5.23, p < .001].  The GEE regression analysis showed that neither 
posterior probability nor type of evidence significantly predicted choices for the confirmed 
alternative [χ2(2) = .78, p = .676, and χ2(1) = 1.79, p =.180, respectively]. The interaction 
between the two factors was also not significant [χ2(2) = .77, p = .679]. The GEE regression 
performed on errors revealed that both impact direction and posterior probability were 
significant predictors [χ2(1) = 26.36, p < .001, and χ2(1) = 28.34, p < .001, respectively], 
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while type of evidence was not [χ2(1) = .83, p = .362]. Errors were less frequent when the 
evidence provided confirmed (vs. disconfirmed) the most likely hypothesis (M = .27, SE = 
.024 and M = .53, SE = .031, respectively; post-hoc test: p < .001) and with .6-.4 (vs. .55-.45) 
posterior (M = .34, SE = .017 and M = .45, SE = .017, respectively; post-hoc test: p < .001). 
No significant interaction effect was obtained among any of the three considered factors (all 
ps > .05). 
Table 21.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of choices for 
the confirmed alternative (all trials) in Experiment 4 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) ,595 ,1387 ,323 ,867 ,000 
posterior= .60-.401 -,009 ,1492 -,301 ,284 ,954 
posterior= .55-.451 ,017 ,1609 -,298 ,332 ,915 
type_of_evidence2 -,264 ,1592 -,576 ,048 ,097 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
2reference category: orientation 
 
Table 22.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of errors (all 
trials) in Experiment 4 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) ,347 ,1870 -,019 ,714 ,063 
Posterior1 -,394 ,1991 -,784 -,004 ,048 
type_of_evidence2 -,032 ,2657 -,553 ,489 ,904 
impact_direction3 -1,247 ,3232 -1,881 -,614 ,000 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
2reference category: orientation 
3reference category: negative 
 
When only consistent trials were included in the analyses, results followed a similar 
pattern. The proportion of choices for the confirmed alternative (M = .70, SD = .23) was 
significantly higher than chance level [t(31) = 4.98, p < .001], and the proportion of errors 
was significantly greater when the evidence disconfirmed (vs. confirmed) the most likely 
hypothesis [M = .53, SD = .24, and M = .17, SD = .19, respectively, t(31) = 5.33, p < .001]. 
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The GEE regression analysis on choices for the confirmed alternative did not reveal any 
significant effect of posterior probability and type of evidence [χ2(2) = .46, p = .794, and 
χ2(1) = 2.41, p = .121, respectively], and no interaction between them, [χ2(2) = 2.33, p = 
.312]. Once again, the GEE regression analysis on errors showed that both impact direction 
and posterior probability were significant predictors [χ2(1) = 27.09, p < .001, and χ2(1) = 
18.72, p < .001, respectively], while type of evidence was not [χ2(1) = .40, p = .528]. No 
significant interaction effects were obtained among any of the factors considered [all ps > 
.05]. 
Table 21.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of choices for 
the confirmed alternative (consistent trials) in Experiment 4 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) 1,293 ,3375 ,631 1,954 ,000 
posterior= .60-.401 -,416 ,3037 -1,011 ,179 ,171 
posterior= .55-.451 -,228 ,3525 -,919 ,463 ,518 
type_of_evidence2 -,683 ,3343 -1,338 -,028 ,041 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
2reference category: orientation 
 
Table 22.  Regression coefficients for the GEE regression on the proportion of errors 
(consistent trials) in Experiment 4 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence Interval Sig. 
Lower Upper 
(Intercept) ,580 ,3172 -,042 1,201 ,068 
Posterior1 -,654 ,3304 -1,301 -,006 ,048 
type_of_evidence2 -,041 ,4662 -,955 ,873 ,930 
impact_direction3 -2,285 ,5861 -3,433 -1,136 ,000 
1 reference category: .50-.50 
2reference category: orientation 
3reference category: negative 
 
4.4.5. Discussion 
In line with our hypotheses, participants chose the confirmed alternative over the 
disconfirmed one across posterior probability levels and types of evidence. The proportion 
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of errors was significantly higher when impact and posterior probability were dissociated, 
across posterior probability levels and types of evidence. The combination of line curvature 
and orientation proved to be the more balanced among those employed in the present 
research. Only in this last experiment, indeed, the type of evidence did not affect the choice 
for the confirmed alternative, nor the amount of errors and no interaction effects between 
the independent variables were found. When the two perceptual features at issue are 
balanced, relative posterior probability of the two hypotheses does not interact with the type 
of evidence being provided when having to choose the confirmed alternative. Similarly, 
impact direction did affect the proportion of errors in participants’ choices regardless of the 





Chapter 5: General discussion, further directions and conclusions 
 
The goal of this work was to investigate whether confirmation relations affect 
probability judgments even when abstract, perceptual material is involved. To test this 
hypothesis, we ran four behavioral experiments in which we used the same paradigm and 
manipulated perceptual features. Overall, the results we found supported our experimental 
claims, showing that probability judgments are affected by evidential impact even when 
perceptual stimuli are at issue. However, if the perceptual features involved were 
characterized by different salience levels, this asymmetry affected probability judgments, as 
shown in Experiments 1 to 3. When the evidence provided was the more salient feature, 
participants’ choices aligned with our hypotheses: confirmed alternative was chosen over 
the disconfirmed one, and the proportion of errors was significantly higher when probability 
and impact diverged. On the other hand, when the less salient feature was given as evidence, 
participants were virtually insensitive to variations in impact and probability: their choice 
for the confirmed alternative across posterior probability levels would generally not deviate 
from chance level. Insensitivity to impact and probability differences also affected the 
percentages of errors: with the less salient feature as evidence, in fact, the percentage of 
errors did not differ in the two levels of the confirmation/probability relation. In Experiment 
4, the two perceptual features composing each figure seemed to be more balanced; in this 
last case, choice patterns were not affected by the feature provided as evidence, nor by the 
relative posterior probability of the two hypotheses, as in Experiments 1 to 3. In the last 
experiment, in fact, participants chose the confirmed alternative over the disconfirmed one 
regardless of the posterior probability of the two hypotheses and of the type of evidence 
provided. Consequently, percentages of errors were significantly higher when the more 
77 
 
probable hypothesis was disconfirmed rather than confirmed. This difference was consistent 
across posterior probability levels as well as types of evidence.  
In addition to supporting our hypotheses, these results suggest the existence of an 
influence from confirmation relations between perceptual features on probability 
judgments, which is relevant because it shows that confirmation relations are capable of 
affecting probability judgments even in absence of any semantic element. In fact, past works 
on confirmation relations involved material with semantic background: it is possible that it 
is easier to think about confirmation relations and process them when they involve concrete 
features that can be easily represented, whereas confirmation relations between abstract, 
geometrical features appear much more arbitrary and hard to process. Another downside of 
abstract features, as suggested by our results, is that they strongly affected participants’ 
responses in three out of four experiments. In fact, when the more salient feature (color vs. 
shape, pattern vs shape) was provided as evidence, participants were able to correctly 
choose the confirmed alternative between two options; on the other hand, when the less 
salient feature appeared as evidence, people appeared to be insensitive to the confirmation 
relations pointing to one or the other alternative. A possible explanation for this finding is 
that people focus on the more salient of the two features composing each item and organize 
the visual set in smaller subsets based on it. Therefore, when this feature is given as evidence, 
people have a clear idea of the conditional probabilities it entails. On the other hand, when 
the less salient feature is given as evidence, people’s choices for the confirmed alternative 
will not differ from chance level and they also will not be affected by the evidence confirming 




 Moreover, despite not reporting any significant effect of participants’ gender on 
choice pattern, the samples of all four experiments are unbalanced with respect to gender: 
this could represent one possible limitation of the study. 
Our experimental results can have alternative explanations which fall outside the 
confirmation-driven framework. As to Experiments 1 and 2, the asymmetry in salience 
between shape and color of each item could have affected choice patterns regardless of the 
statistical structure of each set; that is, the more salient feature could have captured 
participant’s attention and driven their choices, regardless of the other one. To try solving 
this issue, in Experiment 3 we removed the feature ‘color’ and replaced it with ‘pattern’. Yet 
again, even with this new visual set we obtained, shape was overlooked in favor of pattern. 
The explanation we propose for such asymmetry is analogous to the one involving color: the 
more salient feature overcame the less salient one in driving participants’ choices because it 
would allow people to form subsets of the visual set, as mentioned above. Another 
alternative account could rely mostly, or exclusively, on the visual features of the item(s) 
which appeared in the center of the visual set. For example: if participants saw a white circle 
in the center of the screen, they could focus their attention on this item and perceive a 
stronger relation between the two features than the actual one and this judgment would then 
affect the choice in the experimental task. We randomized the position of all the items of a 
set on the screen to minimize the probability of incurring in such a position-driven salience 
effect, but this is still a possible explanation for participants’ choices. However, we believed 
that this effect would disappear when averaging throughout the entire sample. 
Our experimental results have theoretical as well as applied implications. On a 
theoretical level, they extend results coming from works involving verbal and linguistic 
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material (Paperno et al., 2014; Tentori, Chater & Crupi, 2016) to perceptual stimuli with no 
semantic background and provide further evidence for the effect of impact relations on 
probability judgments. Additionally, they show that high-level relations, which are 
completely unknown to the subject, affect the way people perceive relations within a visual 
set of perceptual, two-dimensional items. This last result might have interesting and 
noteworthy implications for psychophysical studies on visual cognition and contingency 
learning because it shows how non-perceptual relations between items might affect those 
perceptual processes on which visual cognition and search are based on. Finally, the 
asymmetry we found in choice patterns in experiments 1 to 3 reflects evidence coming from 
visual perception and search studies (Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004, 2017), revealing how color 
and shape are not equally salient. To understand this asymmetry, a more in-depth discussion 
of color and shape effects in visual perception is due.  
 
5.1 Color, shape and other features in visual search 
Visual attention can be driven to different extent by different perceptual features: 
Treisman & Gormican (1988) reviewed works involving different perceptual features, like 
color, line length, curvature, orientation, and arrangements, and used search latencies to 
infer which features are coded automatically in early vision. Kaptein, Theeuwes, & van der 
Heijden (1995) ran four experiments to investigate to what extent subjects are capable of 
selectively limiting search to a subset of elements based on color. The results showed that 
when subjects were searching for a target defined as a conjunction of color and orientation, 
response latencies on target-present trials depended only on the number of elements in the 
non-target color, indicating that only the subset of elements in the target color was searched. 
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Color based subsets, then, seem to have a crucial role in guiding visual attention. The 
importance of color in the deployment of visual attention is further discussed in a more 
recent work (Adamo et al., 2010) aimed at comparing the relative efficacy of shape and color 
in modulating attentional capture. The results provided evidence of attentional capture by 
both color and shape, but the magnitude of the effect was significantly larger for color than 
for shape. These two features, then, might be associated with different levels within the 
visual processing hierarchy and sets defined by color may be applied more effectively than 
those defined by shape: on a concrete level, this meant that in the experiment participants 
were more likely to orient attention to an irrelevant shape cue than to an irrelevant color 
cue. An additional evidence of the relevance of color in visual search can be found in several 
works by Wolfe (Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004, 2017) aimed at investigating what attributes guide 
the deployment of attention in visual search. These studies suggested that some features are 
more powerful than others in leading visual attention or, in other terms, that there are some 
attributes that undoubtedly guide the deployment of attention, like color or orientation, and 
some others for which there is no such strong support, like color change or semantic 
category. 
Color and shape can also prime visual perception to different extent: Breitmeyer, 
Ogmen and Chen (2004) performed a psychophysical and neurophysiological investigation 
of the types and levels of unconscious processing in color and form perception: the joint 
results from psychophysical and neurophysiological analyses showed that color priming 
happens earlier than shape priming. A series of experiments focused on both color and form 
indicated that choice reaction times for both color and shape are affected by priming in a 
metacontrast masking paradigm. According to the authors, these results indicate that color 
81 
 
and form priming occur at different levels in the visual processing stream; color priming 
depends on a stimulus-dependent response coming from early cortical levels, whereas form 
priming occurs at later levels. An additional experimental work from the same author 
(Breitmeyer, Ro, & Singhal, 2004) provided further proof of an early unconscious color 
priming effect occurring at early levels of processing. This second research involved two 
behavioral, computer-based experiments aimed at exploring unconscious priming effect of 
differently colored stimuli. This asymmetry between color and shape priming could be 
extremely relevant for experiments where shape and color are the two critical dimensions. 
 
5.2. Further steps 
Several further steps could help to better understand the conditions under which 
confirmation and probability interact. One could involve presentation modality: given the 
large number of items presented in each visual set, subitizing was not an option; however, 
one could argue that with a simultaneous presentation, people might be susceptible to 
perceptual grouping and item locations (we obviously randomized object locations in our 
experiments). Sequential presentation could represent a viable option to control for these 
issues: all the items of a same set could be shown sequentially instead of making up a visual 
set. This different modality is not without critical points either: showing items in a sequence 
might give rise to some primacy or recency effects. Ideally, the two modalities could 
counterbalance each other’s flaws.  
The studies we presented demonstrated that, even when performing probabilistic 
inferences, people are affected by impact relations in their judgments. It would be interesting 
to explore how people perceive and conceptualize confirmation relations when explicitly 
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asked about them, that is, what they would base their judgments on when the focus is on 
confirmation. This would allow to test whether and how people process and assess 
confirmation relations when explicitly asked to do so, instead of inferring their strategy from 
their behavior in a probability judgment task. The evidence collected so far in the 
psychological literature showed that probability estimates depend on confirmation 
relations; evidence that impact relations do not depend on probabilities would further 
support the confirmation-theoretic account. To explore choice patterns in impact judgment 
tasks, it is crucial to conceptualize confirmation relations so that people can understand and 
subsequently assess them. When semantic content is available, the relation between 
hypothesis and evidence is transparent and easy to conceptualize, but it gets much more 
blurry and arbitrary in presence of perceptual stimuli with no intrinsic meaning and link. In 
fact, very good performance at estimating impact relations does not necessarily entail that 
people would find it as easy to conceptualize them. This is particularly difficult when abstract 
stimuli are at issue: while it is relatively easy to think of how two real-life concepts are 
associated to each other and to grasp the difference between confirmation and probability 
relations between them (as in Tentori et al., 2016), this difference is much less intuitive when 
abstract, geometric shapes are involved and their relations are purely arbitrary and not 
based on any background knowledge. Moreover, confirmation relations are relative, not 
absolute judgments: they capture the relation between two variables and the (positive or 
negative) change in someone’s belief. Therefore, to investigate them in a direct way one 
would need a reference point to depart from after assessing the impact of the evidence; such 
an operationalization, though, would defy the whole idea of confirmation being a more 
primitive notion than probability. From a purely theoretical point of view, other concepts 
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like contingency or association measures could be considered as proxies for this notion, as 
already discussed in Chapter 2. An experimental question focused on confirmation instead 
of probability judgments would allow to understand whether the former is psychologically 
prior to the latter, as proposed by Tentori, Crupi, Bonini & Osherson (2007). If this were the 
case, confirmation relations, and not probability ones, might be the basis of probabilistic 
inference.  
In Chapter 3, I described the so-called Bayesian brain hypothesis and its implications 
for high- and low-level cognitive processes. Two central claims of this chapter were that the 
brain represents sensory information probabilistically and that it is a Bayesian sampler 
working with a local sense of probability. Our results suggest that confirmation relations 
might play a crucial role in this suboptimal but effective reasoning process. 
As a side note, our results could inform the debate focused on cognitive penetrability. 
Cognitive penetration “describes the influence of higher level cognitive factors on perceptual 
experience” (Vetter & Newen, 2014) and implies that high-level (in our case, confirmation) 
relations affect the perception of some other high-level (probability) relations between low-
level (perceptual) features. We could think of our experimental results as a very particular 
instance of cognitive penetrability where the high-level (confirmation) relations could 
‘penetrate’ the elaboration of the perceptual, low-level material. 
More and less recent experimental works showed distinct brain loci for deductive 
versus probabilistic reasoning (Osherson et al., 1998) and for priors versus likelihoods 
encoding (Vilares et al., 2012; Wiener, Michaelis, & Thompson, 2016). More precisely, 
neuroimaging studies showed that, in perceptual and cognitive decision-making tasks, priors 
and likelihoods are encoded separately, and so are priors and likelihood related- uncertainty. 
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For example, Ting, Yu, Maloney, & Wu (2015) were able to identify priors and likelihoods as 
distinct sources of information in value-based decision making, and localize prior-likelihood 
integration in the brain. Similarly, Ma & Jazayeri (2014) found differential representations 
of prior and likelihood uncertainty in the human brain, meaning that humans can take both 
types of uncertainty into account in their computations. Further investigations could explore 
whether probability estimates and confirmation judgments are also encoded in different 
brain areas, that is, whether a conceptual dissociation between the two notions is associated 
to a spatial and/or functional separation. More specifically: neuroimaging techniques could 
explore whether activation patterns in probabilistic inferences resemble more those 
associated to priors and likelihoods encoding or whether they are characterized by a whole 
different pattern. If the first instance were true, it would provide evidence for probability-
driven inferences; otherwise, it would further support the confirmation-driven account. 
In this work, we demonstrated that confirmation relations affect probability 
judgments even when abstract stimuli with no semantic content are at issue. If people are 
sensitive to arbitrary confirmation relations, it is possible to hypothesize that they are even 
more sensitive to impact relations between semantically charged concepts, as, indeed, 
demonstrated by empirical works we discussed in Chapter 2. In the same chapter, we 
discussed one possible consequence of the sensitivity to confirmation relations, that is 
conjunction fallacy. This fallacy was found and demonstrated in controlled, experimental 
settings but can nonetheless affect probabilistic judgments in social settings leading, for 
example, to stereotypical judgment. Similar to reasoning fallacies and heuristics, stereotypes 
provide a way to make sense of the complexity in the surrounding environment. Under most 
circumstances, they help us behave (i.e. think, take decisions, interact) in an adaptive and 
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sound manner, but in some situations, they can lead to suboptimal judgment and behavior. 
Social psychologists proposed several explanations for stereotypes, mostly focused on 
motivational factors: people engage in stereotyped judgments to make sense of the social 
environment, protect their self (self-serving bias) and their social identity (social identity 
threat). Some other explanations relate to cognitive factors: Kutzner & Fiedler (2017) 
proposed an explanatory account for stereotypes based on pseudocontingencies between 
events or features. These pseudocontingencies lead people to assume correlations between 
attributes based solely on differences between base rates. The authors defined stereotypes 
as “subjectively expected statistical contingencies between attributes and social groups” 
which, then, could be quantified by ΔP. Environmental factors, such as rarity, proximity, 
group categorization make pseudocontingencies and illusory correlations easier to draw. In 
this thesis, I showed that probability judgment is affected by confirmation relations and 
proposed a parallel between confirmation and contingency relations. In stereotypical 
judgments, people learn to associate personality traits and social categories on the basis of 
their experience; this association is not based on probabilistic assumptions, but on the 
observation that belonging to a given social group seems to ‘confirm’ the presence of a 
certain personal trait. Despite allowing quick and effortless social judgments, stereotypical 
relations do not necessarily represent the environment in a truthful and accurate way. 
Similarly, confirmation relations often represent an efficient and easily retrieved tool for 
probability estimates despite representing a deviation from the normative benchmark. If, as 
proposed by Kutzner & Fiedler (2017), stereotypes are based on pseudocontingencies 
between events or features, then it is possible to hypothesize that confirmation-driven 
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Appendix: experimental sets used in Experiment 1.  
Figure 3. Sets 1 to 10. Evidence: shape (triangle); hypothesis: color. 
 
1 2
white black priors Pr(W|triangle)= 0.50 L(W, triangle)= -0.33 white black priors Pr(W|triangle)= 0.50 L(W, triangle)= 0.33
triangle 12 12 24 0.50 triangle 12 12 24 0.50
circle 20 4 24 0.50 Pr(B|triangle)= 0.50 L(B, triangle) = 0.33 circle 4 20 24 0.50 Pr(B|triangle)= 0.50 L(B, triangle) = -0.33
32 16 48 16 32 48
priors 0.667 0.333 priors 0.333 0.667
3 4
white black priors Pr(W|triangle)= 0.55 L(W, triangle)= -0.40 white black priors Pr(W|triangle)= 0.55 L(W, triangle)= 0.38
triangle 12 10 22 0.48 triangle 12 10 22 0.48
circle 22 2 24 0.52 Pr(B|triangle)= 0.45 L(B, triangle) = 0.40 circle 4 20 24 0.52 Pr(B|triangle)= 0.45 L(B, triangle) = -0.38
34 12 46 16 30 46
priors 0.739 0.261 priors 0.348 0.652
5 6
black white priors Pr(B|triangle)= 0.55 L(B, triangle) = -0.40 black white priors Pr(B|triangle)= 0.55 L(B, triangle) = 0.38
triangle 12 10 22 0.48 triangle 12 10 22 0.48
circle 22 2 24 0.52 Pr(W|triangle)= 0.45 L(W, triangle)= 0.40 circle 4 20 24 0.52 Pr(W|triangle)= 0.45 L(W, triangle)= -0.38
34 12 46 16 30 46
priors 0.739 0.261 priors 0.348 0.652
7 8
white black priors Pr(W|triangle)= 0.60 L(W, triangle)= -0.41 white black priors Pr(W|triangle)= 0.60 L(W, triangle)= 0.40
triangle 12 8 20 0.43 triangle 12 8 20 0.43
circle 24 2 26 0.57 Pr(B|triangle)= 0.40 L(B, triangle) = 0.41 circle 6 20 26 0.57 Pr(B|triangle)= 0.40 L(B, triangle) = -0.40
36 10 46 18 28 46
priors 0.783 0.217 priors 0.391 0.609
9 10
black white priors Pr(B|triangle)= 0.60 L(B, triangle) = -0.41 black white priors Pr(B|triangle)= 0.60 L(B, triangle) = 0.40
triangle 12 8 20 0.43 triangle 12 8 20 0.43
circle 24 2 26 0.57 Pr(W|triangle)= 0.40 L(W, triangle)= 0.41 circle 6 20 26 0.57 Pr(W|triangle)= 0.40 L(W, triangle)= -0.40
36 10 46 18 28 46
priors 0.783 0.217 priors 0.391 0.609
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Figure 4. Sets 11 to 20. Evidence: shape (circle); hypothesis: color 
   
11 12
white black priors Pr(W|circle)= 0.50 L(W, circle)= -0.33 white black priors Pr(W|circle)= 0.50 L(W, circle)= 0.33
circle 12 12 24 0.50 circle 12 12 24 0.50
triangle 20 4 24 0.50 Pr(B|circle)= 0.50 L(B, circle) = 0.33 triangle 4 20 24 0.50 Pr(B|circle)= 0.50 L(B, circle) = -0.33
32 16 48 16 32 48
priors 0.667 0.333 priors 0.333 0.667
13 14
white black priors Pr(W|circle)= 0.55 L(W, circle)= -0.40 white black priors Pr(W|circle)= 0.55 L(W, circle)= 0.38
circle 12 10 22 0.48 circle 12 10 22 0.48
triangle 22 2 24 0.52 Pr(B|circle)= 0.45 L(B, circle) = 0.40 triangle 4 20 24 0.52 Pr(B|circle)= 0.45 L(B, circle) = -0.38
34 12 46 16 30 46
priors 0.739 0.261 priors 0.348 0.652
15 16
black white priors Pr(B|circle)= 0.55 L(B, circle) = -0.40 black white priors Pr(B|circle)= 0.55 L(B, circle) = 0.38
circle 12 10 22 0.48 circle 12 10 22 0.48
triangle 22 2 24 0.52 Pr(W|circle)= 0.45 L(W, circle)= 0.40 triangle 4 20 24 0.52 Pr(W|circle)= 0.45 L(W, circle)= -0.38
34 12 46 16 30 46
priors 0.739 0.261 priors 0.348 0.652
17 18
white black priors Pr(W|circle)= 0.60 L(W, circle)= -0.41 white black priors Pr(W|circle)= 0.60 L(W, circle)= 0.40
circle 12 8 20 0.43 circle 12 8 20 0.43
triangle 24 2 26 0.57 Pr(B|circle)= 0.40 L(B, circle) = 0.41 triangle 6 20 26 0.57 Pr(B|circle)= 0.40 L(B, circle) = -0.40
36 10 46 18 28 46
priors 0.783 0.217 priors 0.391 0.609
19 20
black white priors Pr(B|circle)= 0.60 L(B, circle) = -0.41 black white priors Pr(B|circle)= 0.60 L(B, circle) = 0.40
circle 12 8 20 0.43 circle 12 8 20 0.43
triangle 24 2 26 0.57 Pr(W|circle)= 0.40 L(W, circle)= 0.41 triangle 6 20 26 0.57 Pr(W|circle)= 0.40 L(W, circle)= -0.40
36 10 46 18 28 46
priors 0.783 0.217 priors 0.391 0.609
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Figure 5. Sets 21 to 30. Evidence: color (black); hypothesis: shape 
   
21 22
triangle circle priors Pr(T|black)= 0.50 L(T, black)= -0.33 triangle circle priors Pr(T|black)= 0.50 L(T, black)= 0.33
black 12 12 24 0.50 black 12 12 24 0.50
white 20 4 24 0.50 Pr(C|black)= 0.50 L(C, black) = 0.33 white 4 20 24 0.50 Pr(C|black)= 0.50 L(C, black) = -0.33
32 16 48 16 32 48
priors 0.667 0.333 priors 0.333 0.667
23 24
triangle circle priors Pr(T|black)= 0.55 L(T, black)= -0.40 triangle circle priors Pr(T|black)= 0.55 L(T, black)= 0.38
black 12 10 22 0.48 black 12 10 22 0.48
white 22 2 24 0.52 Pr(C|black)= 0.45 L(C, black) = 0.40 white 4 20 24 0.52 Pr(C|black)= 0.45 L(C, black) = -0.38
34 12 46 16 30 46
priors 0.739 0.261 priors 0.348 0.652
25 26
circle triangle priors Pr(C|black)= 0.55 L(C, black) = -0.40 circle triangle priors Pr(C|black)= 0.55 L(C, black) = 0.38
black 12 10 22 0.48 black 12 10 22 0.48
white 22 2 24 0.52 Pr(T|black)= 0.45 L(T, black)= 0.40 white 4 20 24 0.52 Pr(T|black)= 0.45 L(T, black)= -0.38
34 12 46 16 30 46
priors 0.739 0.261 priors 0.348 0.652
27 28
triangle circle priors Pr(T|black)= 0.60 L(T, black)= -0.41 triangle circle priors Pr(T|black)= 0.60 L(T, black)= 0.40
black 12 8 20 0.43 black 12 8 20 0.43
white 24 2 26 0.57 Pr(C|black)= 0.40 L(C, black) = 0.41 white 6 20 26 0.57 Pr(C|black)= 0.40 L(C, black) = -0.40
36 10 46 18 28 46
priors 0.783 0.217 priors 0.391 0.609
29 30
circle triangle priors Pr(C|black)= 0.60 L(C, black) = -0.41 circle triangle priors Pr(C|black)= 0.60 L(C, black) = 0.40
black 12 8 20 0.43 black 12 8 20 0.43
white 24 2 26 0.57 Pr(T|black)= 0.40 L(T, black)= 0.41 white 6 20 26 0.57 Pr(T|black)= 0.40 L(T, black)= -0.40
36 10 46 18 28 46
priors 0.783 0.217 priors 0.391 0.609
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Figure 6. Sets 31 to 40. Evidence: color (white); hypothesis: shape 
31 32
triangle circle priors Pr(T|white)= 0.50 L(T, white)= -0.33 triangle circle priors Pr(T|white)= 0.50 L(T, white)= 0.33
white 12 12 24 0.50 white 12 12 24 0.50
black 20 4 24 0.50 Pr(C|white)= 0.50 L(C, white) = 0.33 black 4 20 24 0.50 Pr(C|white)= 0.50 L(C, white) = -0.33
32 16 48 16 32 48
priors 0.667 0.333 priors 0.333 0.667
33 34
triangle circle priors Pr(T|white)= 0.55 L(T, white)= -0.40 triangle circle priors Pr(T|white)= 0.55 L(T, white)= 0.38
white 12 10 22 0.48 white 12 10 22 0.48
black 22 2 24 0.52 Pr(C|white)= 0.45 L(C, white) = 0.40 black 4 20 24 0.52 Pr(C|white)= 0.45 L(C, white) = -0.38
34 12 46 16 30 46
priors 0.739 0.261 priors 0.348 0.652
35 36
circle triangle priors Pr(C|white)= 0.55 L(C, white) = -0.40 circle triangle priors Pr(C|white)= 0.55 L(C, white) = 0.38
white 12 10 22 0.48 white 12 10 22 0.48
black 22 2 24 0.52 Pr(T|white)= 0.45 L(T, white)= 0.40 black 4 20 24 0.52 Pr(T|white)= 0.45 L(T, white)= -0.38
34 12 46 16 30 46
priors 0.739 0.261 priors 0.348 0.652
37 38
triangle circle priors Pr(T|white)= 0.60 L(T, white)= -0.41 triangle circle priors Pr(T|white)= 0.60 L(T, white)= 0.40
white 12 8 20 0.43 white 12 8 20 0.43
black 24 2 26 0.57 Pr(C|white)= 0.40 L(C, white) = 0.41 black 6 20 26 0.57 Pr(C|white)= 0.40 L(C, white) = -0.40
36 10 46 18 28 46
priors 0.783 0.217 priors 0.391 0.609
39 40
circle triangle priors Pr(C|white)= 0.60 L(C, white) = -0.41 circle triangle priors Pr(C|white)= 0.60 L(C, white) = 0.40
white 12 8 20 0.43 white 12 8 20 0.43
black 24 2 26 0.57 Pr(T|white)= 0.40 L(T, white)= 0.41 black 6 20 26 0.57 Pr(T|white)= 0.40 L(T, white)= -0.40
36 10 46 18 28 46
priors 0.783 0.217 priors 0.391 0.609
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